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vForeword
I
t is now widely accepted that social safety nets play a crucial role in any comprehensive
poverty alleviation strategy. However, many people perceive that existing social safety nets
are not cost effective because they are both badly targeted to poor households and often
involve inefficient financing policies. Consequently, many developing-country governments
and international development institutions have come to favor direct transfer instruments such
as cash transfers or subsidized food rations. But most evaluations of such programs focus solely
on the partial equilibrium impacts of program targeting outcomes, and those that focus on the
general equilibrium impacts tend to concentrate on their efficiency implications with very lim-
ited analysis of income distribution outcomes and little attempt to combine both the equity
and efficiency dimensions.
In this report, Coady and Harris study the general equilibrium effects of transfer programs,
focusing on the recent switch by the government of Mexico toward targeted transfer programs
and away from universal food subsidies. They show how the results from a computable gen-
eral equilibrium model can be combined with the information available in standard household
surveys to provide an integrated analysis of both the direct distributional impact of such pro-
grams and the indirect distributional and efficiency impacts arising from the nature of its
domestic financing. The focus on the domestic financing aspect of these programs reflects the
view that any credible poverty alleviation strategy must have a credible underlying financing
strategy, and this need for domestic financing can have important consequences for both the
level and the distribution of household incomes. It is often argued, for example, that the major
constraints for developing countries in establishing a comprehensive social safety net are the
undue strain put on domestic finances and the economic inefficiencies generated by the policy
instruments used.
The results presented in the report clearly show that the general equilibrium welfare im-
pacts associated with domestic financing can be quite substantial. When initial redistribution
mechanisms are inefficient, the welfare gains from switching to a better-targeted direct transfer
scheme are reinforced by efficiency gains associated with the removal of relatively distortionary
financing instruments. More generally, the indirect welfare costs associated with domestic
financing can be reduced by taking the opportunity to reform the existing tax system to reduce
any existing trade-off between efficiency and equity objectives. The analysis of the spatial dis-
tribution of these welfare impacts helps to highlight the importance of recognizing the short-
comings of crude geographic targeting. Not only did the urban poor not benefit from the trans-
fer program but they were also adversely affected by its general equilibrium impacts. The
analysis also found, however, that combining the transfer program with efficient tax reforms
reduced this adverse impact and ultimately benefited the urban poor through the general equi-
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t is now widely accepted that social safety nets play a crucial role in any comprehensive
poverty alleviation strategy. Existing social safety nets, however, are perceived by many as
not very cost effective because they are very badly targeted to poor households and in ad-
dition often involve inefficient pricing policies. For example, a recent review of social safety
net programs found that a staggering one quarter of the programs for which there was empir-
ical evidence had regressive benefit incidence, that is, the poor received less than their popu-
lation share. Among the most poorly targeted transfer programs were universal food subsidies,
which have also been found to generate substantial economic inefficiency in both production
and consumption patterns. This has led both developing country governments and international
development institutions to put more emphasis on developing well-targeted direct transfer in-
struments, either in the form of cash transfers (e.g., in Latin America) or subsidized food rations
(e.g., in South Asia).
When evaluating the economic impact of such transfers, it is useful to separate these into
direct and indirect income (or welfare) effects. The direct income effects reflect the design of
the program (i.e., the rules for targeting transfers); these are often referred to as first-round
effects and are captured by partial equilibrium approaches to policy evaluation. The indirect ef-
fects capture the second-round income changes brought about by the impact of cash transfers,
and their financing, on the level and composition of demand and supply. Most evaluations of
social safety net programs focus on the partial equilibrium evaluation of program targeting
outcomes. Even those that focus on the indirect impacts tend to concentrate on their efficiency
implications, with only a very limited analysis of income distribution outcomes and little at-
tempt to combine both the equity and efficiency dimensions. This, of course, is all the more
limiting given that the central objective of these programs is to improve income distribution.
It is often argued, for example, that one of the major constraints facing developing coun-
tries wishing to develop a comprehensive social safety net is the fact that they put undue strain
on domestic finances and are often financed using policy instruments that generate substantial
economic inefficiencies. In such circumstances the gains from developing more direct trans-
fer mechanisms are twofold. First, better targeted transfer programs can generate a larger im-
pact on poverty alleviation for the same budget cost (or, equivalently, the same impact at lower
cost). Second, substantial welfare gains may be achieved by replacing existing inefficient
transfer instruments with more efficient direct transfer schemes. The central objective of this
report then is to clarify such issues and show how they can be evaluated in an integrated
framework.
In this report we contribute to filling this research gap by focusing primarily on the indi-
rect general equilibrium impacts of the shift to better targeted direct transfer programs. In par-
ticular, we show how the results from a computable general equilibrium model can be combined
with the information available in standard household surveys to provide an integrated analysis
of both the direct distributional impact of such programs and the indirect distributional and
efficiency impacts arising from the alternative forms of domestic financing. Our focus on the
domestic financing aspect of these programs reflects our view that any credible poverty al-
viiileviation strategy must have an underlying credible financing strategy, and this need for do-
mestic financing can have important consequences for both the level and the distribution of
household incomes. For the purpose of illustration we focused on the recent introduction in
Mexico of an innovative poverty alleviation transfer program called PROGRESA, which has
been used as a prototype for similar programs that have recently been implemented in other
developing countries.
In Chapter 2 we set out a very general theoretical model that identifies the different sources
of the indirect welfare impacts of different financing strategies for a targeted cash-transfer
program. The analytical equations derived using the model show clearly the three sources of
welfare impacts. First, a redistribution effect arises from the fact that someone must be taxed
in order to pay for the cost of the transfer program. For example, if high-income households
bore the brunt of this taxation, and if we attributed a social value to a more equal distribution
of income, then the resulting welfare cost would be less than the direct welfare gain from the
transfers. Second, a reallocation effect results from the fact that the pattern of demand will
change if those who finance the program have income elasticities of demand different from
those who receive the transfers. The resulting demand changes can have important con-
sequences for government revenues when taxes vary substantially across commodities.
The welfare effects arise essentially because demand shifts away from (or toward) commodities
for which demand was previously too low owing to their inefficiently high tax rates. Third, a
distortionary effect arises because of the need to raise the revenue to finance the program
through manipulating distortionary commodity taxes and subsidies. For example, if the pro-
gram is financed by reducing distortionary subsidies, then this effect is positive, but if financed
by increasing distortionary taxes then it may be negative.
Knowledge of the aforementioned dimensions of the welfare impact of the program also
helps us to interpret the results from our empirical analysis in the subsequent chapters. With
this in mind, we therefore also show how the preceding model can be adapted to provide a
useful framework for integrating the simulation results from a computable general equilibrium
model with the more disaggregated information available in a household data set. We further
show how the three components can be usefully subsumed within one parameter, namely, the
cost of public funds. Because concerns for equity are the major motivating factor for such pro-
grams, we make explicit how these concerns are captured by this parameter.
In Chapter 3 we describe how we have applied the theoretical framework developed in the
previous chapter to data for Mexico to evaluate the welfare impact of introducing a targeted
direct cash-transfer program in rural areas of the country. We started by describing the con-
struction and structure of the computable general equilibrium model used to simulate the in-
direct welfare impacts of alternative financing strategies. Our results help to bring out clearly
that the actual program, which finances the direct transfers by eliminating existing food
subsidies, has two sources of benefit: (1) the introduction of a more distributionally powerful
transfer policy instrument and (2) the fact that this reduces the need to trade off equity objec-
tives against efficiency objectives when designing the tax system. These factors combined
result in a very large welfare increase from such a policy reform; for moderate concerns for
income inequality, the benefit–cost ratio for the program was around 4, which is a very high
social return by any standards.
To broaden the relevance of the analysis to a wider set of countries with differing pos-
sibilities for financing such transfer programs, we also considered alternative financing strate-
gies. These involved different manipulations of the existing value-added tax system. Although
the welfare gains from these alternative financing regimes were not as high, they were still
substantial. They were also higher when the reforms involved changes in the tax system that
made it more efficient (e.g., redirecting tax rates toward commodities with relatively low price
SUMMARY ixelasticities away from those with relatively high elasticities). More generally, then, the indi-
rect welfare cost of funding such programs can be substantially lowered when the programs
are accompanied by efficient reforms of the tax system.
Finally, because the construction of our computable general equilibrium model requires
using behavioral parameters for which there is scant empirical evidence, we thought it impor-
tant to evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to alternative assumptions. We there-
fore undertook sensitivity analysis using a range of consumption, production, and international
trade behavioral responses. In all cases we found that our results were extremely robust
to alternative values for the more important parameter values.
One of the attractive features of the computable general equilibrium model used for our
analysis is the degree of spatial disaggregation it contains with separate sub-models for four
rural regions and an urban region. Information on the differential regional welfare impacts is
important for a number of reasons. For example, the regional distribution of welfare impacts
can be important from a political economy perspective concerned with generating political
support for the program. Similarly, because of differential regional impacts, the distribution of
poverty after the program may differ from that before the program, and such information can
be extremely important for the design of other components of a poverty alleviation strategy. For
example, the exclusion of urban areas in the first phase of the program will obviously affect
the urban–rural proportions of poverty and the indirect effects can either mitigate or exacerbate
these outcomes.
Therefore, in Chapter 4 we analyze the regional pattern of welfare changes in more detail
using a related but somewhat different methodology, which is becoming increasingly popular
in the literature, to evaluate the welfare impact of the transfer program. This approach focuses
separately on the impacts on both mean income and the inequality of its distribution and views
total welfare as the product of the two. We find this approach particularly useful for examin-
ing the regional variations in the welfare impact of the program and its application here pro-
vides a useful example of its application and its relationship to the approach used in earlier
chapters. In Chapter 4 we analyze the differential regional impacts that targeted transfer pro-
grams can generate, and how this spatial distribution of welfare changes differs across alter-
native domestic financing arrangements. Our analysis makes use of the regional disaggregation
of the underlying social accounting matrix and computable general equilibrium model. We
identify four rural regions (i.e., North, Central, Southwest, and Southeast) and one urban re-
gion, which differ according to production and consumption patterns as well as inter-regional
flows.
Our analysis highlights the following features of the results. First, the direct impact of the
transfers (i.e., before their financing is accounted for) differs regionally owing to the initial
distribution of poverty varying across regions. The poorest regions experience both the largest
increases in mean incomes and the largest decreases in inequality. The large decreases in in-
equality reflect (by construction) the high distributional power of the targeted program. Sec-
ond, the incidence of the taxation introduced to finance the program differs substantially
across regions and is regressive overall. The progressive effect of program financing in terms
of decreasing inter-regional inequality is more than offset by the regressive effect in terms of
increasing intra-regional inequality. Thus, the overall effect on inequality is lower than that
under the direct effect alone. The high distributional power inherent in the targeted nature of
the program means that inequality decreases in all rural regions.
Third, the aggregate effect of taxation is very sensitive to the program financing strategy.
The move to a more efficient tax system (e.g., removing agriculture subsidies or increasing
VAT on necessities) both increases aggregate income and is less regressive than moves toward
the more inefficient alternatives (e.g., involving increasing taxes on luxuries). Fourth, the
x SUMMARYregional effects of taxation are also very sensitive to the program financing strategy. The more
efficient tax systems have a clear bias in favor of urban areas, resulting in a lower negative
impact on urban mean income and also a less regressive tax incidence. The less efficient tax
systems lead to higher mean incomes in all rural areas, but especially in North and Central.
But the latter come at a cost in terms of a more regressive tax incidence. The relatively smaller
positive effect on mean incomes in Southeast and Southwest (compared to North and Central)
under the inefficient tax systems reflects the relatively stronger negative impact of lower mean
income in urban areas. Fifth, although the program leads to a substantial decrease in poverty
at the national level, the exclusion of urban areas means that urban poverty increases and, after
the program, accounts for a substantially higher proportion of total national poverty (i.e., an
increase from 18 percent before the program to 30 percent after the program). The increase in
urban poverty is also sensitive to the financing strategy used, with the less (more) efficient tax
system leading to a 10 percent (5 percent) increase in urban poverty. This highlights the short-
comings inherent in rural targeting and raises concerns associated with horizontal equity.
To summarize, one of the main purposes of this report is to bring out clearly the need to
consider the general equilibrium consequences of redesigning social safety nets with the ob-
jective of making them more cost effective. To this end we have presented a framework that
facilitates such an analysis by showing how the results from an applied computable general
equilibrium model can be integrated with the information available in household surveys to
provide a more comprehensive evaluation of the welfare implications of domestically financed
targeted transfer programs. In the context of a cash-transfer program in Mexico, our results
indicate that the general equilibrium welfare impacts associated with domestic financing can
be quite substantial. When initial redistribution mechanisms are inefficient, the welfare gains
from switching to a better targeted direct transfer scheme are reinforced by efficiency gains
associated with the removal of relatively distortionary financing instruments. More generally,
the indirect welfare costs associated with domestic financing can be reduced by taking the op-
portunity to reform the existing tax system to reduce any existing trade-off that exists between
efficiency and equity objectives. Our analysis of the spatial distribution of these welfare im-
pacts helps to highlight the importance of recognizing the shortcomings of crude geographic
targeting. Not only did the urban poor not benefit from the transfer program but they were also
adversely affected by the general equilibrium impacts of the program. However, we also found
that accompanying the transfer program with efficient reforms of the tax system can not only
minimize this adverse impact but may actually lead to the urban poor benefiting through the




t is now widely accepted that social safety nets play a crucial role in any comprehensive
poverty alleviation strategy (World Bank 1997). Existing social safety nets, however, are
perceived by many as not very cost effective because they are very badly targeted to poor
households and often involve inefficient pricing policies. For example, a recent review of so-
cial safety net programs found that a staggering 25 percent of the programs for which empir-
ical evidence was available had regressive benefit incidence, that is, the poor received less
than their population share (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004). Among the most poorly tar-
geted transfer programs were universal food subsidies, which have also been found to generate
substantial economic inefficiency in both production and consumption patterns (Mellor and
Ahmed 1988; Coady 1997; Newbery and Stern 1987). This has led both developing-country
governments and international development institutions to put more emphasis on developing
well-targeted direct transfer instruments, either in the form of cash transfers (e.g., Latin Amer-
ica) or subsidized food rations (e.g., South Asia).
When evaluating the economic impact of such transfers, it is useful to separate these into
direct and indirect income (or welfare) effects. The direct income effects reflect the design of
the program (i.e., the rules for targeting transfers); these are often referred to as first-round ef-
fects and are captured by partial equilibrium approaches to policy evaluation. The indirect
effects capture the second-round income changes brought about by the impact of cash trans-
fers, and their financing, on the level and composition of demand and supply. Most evaluations
of social safety net programs focus on the partial equilibrium evaluation of program targeting
outcomes. Even those that focus on the indirect impacts tend to concentrate on their efficiency
implications, with only a very limited analysis of income distribution outcomes and little at-
tempt to combine both the equity and efficiency dimensions. This, of course, is all the more
limiting given that the central objective of these programs is to improve income distribution.
In this report, we focus primarily on the indirect effects of transfer programs. In particular
we show how the results from a computable general equilibrium model can be combined with
the information available in standard household surveys to provide an integrated analysis of
both the direct distributional impact of such programs and the indirect distributional and effi-
ciency impacts arising from the nature of its domestic financing. Our focus on the domestic
financing aspect of these programs reflects our view that any credible poverty alleviation strat-
egy must have an underlying credible financing strategy, and this need for domestic financing
can have important consequences for both the level and the distribution of household incomes.
It is often argued, for example, that one of the major constraints facing developing coun-
tries wishing to develop comprehensive social safety nets is the fact that such systems put
undue strain on domestic finances and are often financed using policy instruments that gener-
ate substantial economic inefficiencies. In such circumstances the gains from developing more
1direct transfer mechanisms are twofold. First,
better targeted transfer programs can gen-
erate a larger impact on poverty alleviation
for the same budget cost (or, equivalently,
the same impact at lower cost). Second, sub-
stantial welfare gains may be achieved by
replacing existing inefficient transfer instru-
ments with more efficient direct transfer
schemes. The central objective of this re-
port then is to clarify such issues and show
how they can be evaluated in an integrated
framework.
For the purpose of illustration we focus
on the recent introduction in Mexico of an
innovative poverty alleviation transfer pro-
gram called PROGRESA. This program has
two defining features. First, using a combi-
nation of targeting methods, it targets trans-
fers at poor rural households in some of the
remotest parts of the country. Second, con-
tinued eligibility for these transfers is con-
ditioned on beneficiaries investing in the
human capital status of their children
through increased attendance at school and
health clinics. Although the latter condition
is a crucial component of the program, it is
the former that we are concerned with in
this report.1 This program has provided a
prototype for similar programs that have
recently been implemented in other devel-
oping countries.2
The cash transfers in PROGRESA are
substantial and constitute, on average, about
a 30 percent increase in total income for
beneficiary households. The first phase of
the program focused only on rural house-
holds and thus excluded poor households in
urban areas. The program was introduced in
August 1997, and by the end of 1999 had
covered 2.6 million rural households, equiv-
alent to about 40 percent of all rural house-
holds and one ninth of all Mexican house-
holds. Its budget in that year was US$777
million, equivalent to about 0.2 percent of
Mexican gross domestic product (GDP) and
20 percent of the total federal poverty alle-
viation budget.
This report is organized as follows. To
facilitate understanding of the sources of
the indirect welfare effects from a domes-
tically financed cash-transfer program, in
Chapter 2 we set out a simple general equi-
librium model that shows how one can sep-
arate these effects into three components.
First, a redistribution effect arises from the
fact that someone must be taxed in order to
pay for the cost of the transfer program. If
high-income households bear the brunt of
this taxation, and if we attribute a social
value to a more equal distribution of in-
come, then the resulting welfare cost will be
less than the direct welfare gain from the
transfers. Second, a reallocation effect re-
sults from the fact that the pattern of de-
mand will change if those who finance the
program have income elasticities of demand
different from those who receive the trans-
fers. The resulting demand changes can
have important consequences for govern-
ment revenues when taxes vary substan-
tially across commodities. The welfare ef-
fects arise essentially because demand shifts
away from (or toward) commodities for
which demand was previously already too
low (high) because of their inefficiently
high (low) tax rates. Third, a distortionary
effect arises because of the need to raise the
revenue to finance the program through
manipulating distortionary commodity taxes
and subsidies. For example, if the program
is financed by reducing distortionary sub-
sidies, then this effect is positive, but if
financed by increasing distortionary taxes
then it may be negative.
2 CHAPTER 1
1See Skoufias (2001), Coady (2003), and Morley and Coady (2003) for more details on the program design
and impact as well as the numerous reports generated as part of the evaluation. These are all available on
<http://www.ifpri.org/themes/progresa.htm>.
2For example, programs now exist or are in the planning stages in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Turkey.Knowledge of the aforementioned di-
mensions of the welfare impact of the pro-
gram will also help us to interpret the results
from our analysis. In Chapter 2 we also
show how the above model can be adapted
to provide a useful framework for integrat-
ing the simulation results from a comput-
able general equilibrium model with the
more disaggregated information available in
a household data set. We further show how
the three components can be usefully sub-
sumed within one parameter, namely, the
cost of public funds. Because concerns for
equity are the major motivating factor for
such programs, we make explicit how these
concerns are captured by this parameter.
In Chapter 3 we present an illustration
of the approach using data for Mexico to
evaluate the recent redirection of the gov-
ernment’s poverty alleviation strategy away
from universal food subsidies toward tar-
geted cash transfers. We start by setting out
the details of the computable general equi-
librium model used to trace through the
general equilibrium responses to the initial
increase in demand generated by the trans-
fers. We describe the data and assumptions
used to construct the model and the nature
of the policy simulations carried out. We
also simulate alternative financing scenarios
involving various reforms of the existing
value-added tax system. Both these sets of
simulations help to broaden the relevance
of our analysis to a larger set of countries
with differing financing constraints. We
conclude this chapter with a detailed discus-
sion of the results of the simulations.
One of the attractive features of the
computable general equilibrium model used
for our analysis is the degree of spatial dis-
aggregation it contains with separate sub-
models for four rural regions and an urban
region. Information on the differential re-
gional welfare impacts is important for a
number of reasons. For example, the re-
gional distribution of welfare impacts can
be important from a political economy per-
spective concerned with generating political
support for the program. Similarly, because
of differential regional impacts, the spatial
distribution of poverty after the program may
differ from that before the program, and
such information can be extremely impor-
tant for the design of other components of a
poverty alleviation strategy. For example, the
exclusion of urban areas in the first phase of
the program will obviously affect the
urban–rural shares of poverty, and the indi-
rect effects can either mitigate or exacerbate
these outcomes. Therefore, in Chapter 4
we look at the regional pattern of welfare
changes in more detail. In this chapter we
use a related but somewhat different
methodology, which is becoming increas-
ingly popular in the literature, to evaluate
the welfare impact of the transfer program.
This approach focuses separately on the
impacts on both mean income and the in-
equality of its distribution and views total
welfare as the product of the two. We find
this approach particularly useful for exam-
ining the regional variations in the welfare
impact of the program and its application
here provides a useful example of its appli-
cation and its relationship to the approach
used in earlier chapters. Finally, Chapter 5




e start this chapter by presenting a general equilibrium theoretical model of the
economy that identifies the different sources of the welfare impacts of domes-
tically financed cash-transfer programs. We then show how this model can be
adapted to provide a useful framework for integrating the results from policy simulations
within an applied computable general equilibrium model with the more disaggregated data
available from household data sets. The analytical equations derived from the model make
explicit how the separate distributional and efficiency implications of these policies enter into
the analysis. We also clarify the role of the cost of public funds in the analysis and how it needs
to be adjusted in order to arrive at the indirect welfare cost arising from the need to finance
the transfers domestically. We derive a benefit–cost ratio, defined as the direct welfare bene-
fit from the transfers divided by the indirect cost from domestic financing, which serves as
a sufficient statistic for evaluating alternative financing strategies and provides a useful ap-
proach for presenting the results from the simulations. For presentational purposes, the model
shown is, of course, much more simple than the applied computable general equilibrium
model used to evaluate policy regimes but it does suffice for our purpose of structuring and
interpreting the results from our analysis.
A Theoretical Model
The purpose of this section is to use a simple model to bring out the source of welfare changes
arising from transfer programs and their domestic financing, particularly financing packages
involving reforms in commodity taxes and subsidies. Consider an economy made up of house-
holds, firms, and the government.3 Firms are assumed to maximize profits subject to con-
stant returns to scale production functions so that supply is demand determined, profits are
zero, and producer prices are fixed. The welfare of household h is captured by a standard in-
direct utility function, Vh(q, mh), where q is a vector of consumer commodity and (negative)
factor prices, and mh is household lump-sum income (which here is synonymous with gov-
3To bring out the main sources of welfare changes, the model presented is simpler than the CGE model used in
our illustration of the methodology that follows. More complex market structures, however, can be easily incor-
porated by replacing producer prices with shadow prices and actual government revenue with shadow govern-
ment revenue (see Drèze and Stern 1987). However, the analysis as presented here will still go through with only
minor changes (Coady and Drèze 2002).
4ernment transfers, rh, i.e., mh ≡ rh).4 The
budget constraint for each household is then
given by:
qxh = mh ≡ rh
where x is the demand for final goods and
the supply of factors. The government’s




where t is a vector of taxes on commodities
consumed and factors supplied by house-
holds respectively, and t ≡ q –  p with  p
being a vector of producer prices. Because
producer prices are assumed fixed we have
dq = dt.5
The planner’s problem in this economy
is to maximize social welfare, W(⋅), subject
to the government’s budget constraint. Social
welfare is typically captured by a Bergson–
Samuelson social welfare function of the
form:
W(V1(q, m1) ,...,   Vh(q, mh) ,...,
VH(q, mH))
defined over Hhouseholds.6The correspond-
ing Lagrangean can be written as:
 ≡ W(V1(p, t, r1) ,...,  
Vh(p, t, rh) ,...,   VH(p, t, rH))
+λ(tx(p, t, rh) – Σ
h
rh) (1)
where {t, r h} are the policy parameters
whose reform is under consideration and λ
can be interpreted as the marginal social
value of government revenue and is often
referred to as the “cost of public funds.” If
V* is the maximum value function for the
above Lagrangean then, from the envelope
theorem, we know that the gradient of V* is
the same as the gradient of the Lagrangean.
Therefore, the welfare impact of changes
in {t, rh} is given by the derivative of the
Lagrangean with respect to the relevant pol-
icy parameter. The impact of any “policy
reform” on social welfare is thus captured
by the direct welfare impact of the reform
through W(⋅) plus the indirect welfare im-
pact attributable to changing government
revenue.
The preceding formulation of the prob-
lem has the attraction of presenting the
problem in terms of the standard trade-off
between consumer welfare and government
revenue. However, it has a clear general
equilibrium interpretation. This can be seen
by substituting the household budget con-
straint into the government revenue con-
straint and allowing for the fact that under
constant returns to scale profits are zero,
that is, py= 0, where y is a vector of do-
mestic commodity and factor supplies. This
gives:
R ≡ (q – p)x – Σ
h
rh = p⋅(y – x)
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 5
4Throughout we use boldface type to denote vectors (lowercase) and matrices (uppercase).
5Although the analytical equations derived in the following are based on differentiating the Lagrangean with re-
spect to policy parameters as if producer prices (including factor prices) are fixed, this does not require the as-
sumption that producer prices are actually fixed. The device of holding producer prices constant is much more
general than it appears at first sight. For example, the derivation is valid if any of the following holds: (1) pro-
ducer prices are actually fixed (as in Diamond and Mirrlees 1975); (2) producer prices adjust endogenously to
clear the scarcity constraints; and (3) producer prices are directly controlled and set optimally by the planner. See
Drèze and Stern (1987, 1990) for a more detailed discussion.
6This specification has important implications for the way in which we model the program later. In particular, the
absence of public goods from the utility functions and the static nature of the specification mean that to ensure
consistency we must keep both real government consumption (i.e., public consumption) and investment constant
in our CGE model.Therefore, when commodity and factor mar-
kets are balanced (i.e., supply equal demand)
then so too is the government budget and
vice versa. Similarly, policy reforms that bal-
ance the budget will also leave commodity
and factor markets balanced.7
The policy reforms under consideration
are a cash-transfer program, dr ≡ {drh}, to
be financed by a revenue neutral change in
commodity taxes or subsidies, dt. The wel-
fare impact of the cash-transfer program in
isolation can be seen by differentiating (1)
w.r.t. r to get:






drh – t⋅Xm⋅dr) (2)
where βh ≡ (∂W/∂mh) is the social valuation
of extra income accruing to h (or “welfare
weight”) and Xmis a matrix with each house-
hold’s marginal budget shares across com-
modities as column entries. The first term
captures the direct welfare impact of the
cash-transfer program as depicted by typical
evaluations of such programs. The term in
brackets is the net revenue cost of the pro-
gram calculated as the program budget ad-
justed for any changes in revenue due to
changing demands by these households for
taxed or subsidized commodities. The cost of
public funds, λ, is the social cost of raising
a unit of revenue and will obviously depend
on the set of instruments used to balance the
budget and the incidence of this financing.
Note that equation (2) can be rewritten
as (Coady and Drèze 2002):
dW =Σ
h
(βh – λ)drh +λ(t⋅Xm⋅dr) (3)
The first term captures the pure redistri-
bution impact and can be expected to be
positive if those receiving transfers are on
average more deserving (i.e., have higher
welfare weights) than those who will fi-
nance the program. The second term can be
thought of as a reallocation impact and
captures the deadweight loss from lump-sum
transfers in the presence of tax distortions.
This reallocation effect arises from the fact
that the initial pattern of consumption was
distorted owing to consumer prices being
different from producer prices, the latter
capturing the true social cost of production
in this model (i.e., producer prices coincide
with shadow prices). Reforms that switch
demand toward commodities with con-
sumer prices being too high (e.g., because
of relatively high taxes) will thus increase
welfare, and this is reflected through an in-
crease in government revenue.
Now consider the transfer program being
financed by a change in indirect taxes, dt.
Using the standard properties of the indirect
utility function, the welfare impact of a tax
change is then:
∂ dW = —– dt = –β⋅x⋅dt
∂t
∂x +λ(x + t⋅—–)dt (4)
∂t
The first term indicates that households gain
(or lose) from the tax change according to
the level of their existing consumption, that
is, the existing level of demand gives a mea-
sure of this welfare effect in money terms.
The direct impact on social welfare is greater
the more lower-income households (i.e., with
high βs) consume the commodities with the
highest tax increases. Again, the social cost
of raising revenue using a commodity tax
is lower if households respond to the price
change by switching demand away from
(toward) relatively highly subsidized (taxed)
commodities. Rearranging equation (4) and




(βh – λ) xhdt – λtXmxdt
∂xc
+λt — — dt (5)
∂q
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7For more details see Drèze and Stern (1987, pp. 930–932).where xc is the compensated demand func-
tion. Again the first term is the redistribu-
tion effect comparing the distribution of the
tax burden across households to the inci-
dence of the policy instruments used to
balance the budget. The second term is the
reallocation effect arising from the income
effects of the tax change. The third is the
distortion effect of using distortionary taxes
to finance the transfers.8 The final two terms
thus capture the efficiency implications of
taxes.
Later, in our discussion of the results
fromvarious policy simulations, we will use
the preceding discussion of the sources of
the welfare changes arising from a domesti-
cally financed transfer program to interpret
our findings. These simulations choose dt
to balance the budget, that is, so that the
revenue from these taxes exactly covers the
net revenue effect of the transfers. In other
words, the welfare changes are all passed on
to households by adjusting dt to balance the
budget. If efficiency effects are negative
(e.g., through transfers resulting in a switch
in consumption toward subsidized com-
modities and/or the government introducing
distortionary taxes to balance the budget)
then taxes will have to be higher than in the
absence of this negative effect.
For presentational purposes, the model
presented in the foregoing discussion as-
sumes that producer prices are constant and
that the only “distortions” in the economy
are attributable to the presence of domestic
indirect taxes. However, the preceding re-
sults can be easily extended with minor
modifications to a wider set of second-best
structures discussed in the literature, for
example, to allow for changing producer
prices and the presence of consumer and
producer rationing and trade taxes.9 Essen-
tially one simply replaces domestic taxes,
t, with “shadow taxes,” t*, defined as the
difference between consumer prices and
“shadow prices,” that is:
t* ≡ (q – v) = (q – p) – (p –v)
where v is a vector of “shadow prices,” p a
vector of producer prices, (q – p) is a vector
of domestic taxes, and (p – v) a vector of
“shadow producer taxes.” For example, the
shadow price for a traded commodity is
usually taken as its world price, and import
tariffs and export taxes create a wedge be-
tween this price and domestic consumer and
producer prices. More generally, shadow
prices will depend on the structure of the
economy (e.g., whether a good is traded or
nontraded or whether markets are perfectly
competitive or not) as well as the set of pol-
icy instruments available to the government
(e.g., instruments for distributing income or
taxing profits). Such issues therefore enter
the preceding welfare analysis through the
specification of shadow prices.
Application of the Model
A Two-Step Approach
To identify the general equilibrium effects
identified in the preceding, we use a com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model of
the economy and apply the following two-
step approach. First, the transfers are fed into
the CGE model and we consider alternative
budget-closure rules. Then, together with
the direct transfers, the resulting indirect
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8See Allgood and Snow (1998), and references therein, for analyses that focus solely on the final two “efficiency”
effects in the context of a redistribution program financed by a reform of a progressive income tax structure in
the United States. Our first term captures the additional impact on social welfare resulting from the redistribution
of income from a socially suboptimal position, as discussed in Ballard (1988). We later further clarify how re-
distribution concerns enter the analysis of the indirect welfare impacts. See also Coady and Drèze (2002) for a
more detailed discussion of commodity tax reform.
9See Drèze and Stern (1987) and Coady and Drèze (2002) for a more detailed discussion.effects simulated in the CGE model (i.e.,
proportional income changes attributable
to factor price changes as well as the com-
modity price changes) are superimposed on
the disaggregated household data, where
households are mapped to one of the repre-
sentative households in the CGE. These are
then aggregated to calculate the total impact
on social welfare.
To get a more detailed understanding
of this two-step procedure, consider the fol-
lowing. For all revenue neutral reforms, all
indirect welfare effects operate through
changes in commodity and factor prices.
Fully differentiating the social welfare func-
tion above after separating out factor (w) and
commodity prices (q), the welfare effects

















where the first term captures the direct wel-
fare effect from income transfers and the
final two terms capture the indirect welfare
effects coming through the resulting general
equilibrium changes in commodity and fac-
tor prices, respectively.
In Appendix Awe show that defining βh
≡ (∂W/∂mh) and using Roy’s identity, this











where deh is the change in factor incomes,
xi
h is the quantity of commodity i consumed
by household h, and dqi the corresponding
price change. Multiplying and dividing all
terms by total income yh and the last term
also by qi, and using the household budget
constraint, this can be rewritten as:
dW =Σ
h




where  φh and  γh are the proportionate
changes in household income due to the di-
rect transfers and indirect (factor) income
effects respectively, ρi the proportionate
change in the price of commodity i, and θi
h
is the share of expenditure on commodity i
in the total expenditure of the household.
The term in brackets can be interpreted as
the proportionate change in real incomes
(i.e., nominal incomes minus a cost-of-liv-
ing index). These proportionate changes are
outputs from the CGE model and are then
applied to household-level data.
To apply the above approach, one needs
to specify the welfare weights βh.These can
be calculated as:
βh = (yk/yh)ε
where  yk is the income of a reference
household (for which βk = 1) and ε can be
interpreted as an “inequality aversion” pa-
rameter with concern for inequality increas-
ing with ε. For example, with ε=0 all wel-
fare weights take the value unity so that
extra income to all households is considered
equally socially valuable. With ε=1, the so-
cial value of extra income to a household
with twice the initial income of k is consid-
ered only as half as socially valuable as
extra income to k. This welfare weight de-
creases to a quarter when ε=2 and so on.10
The Cost of Public Funds
We now present a very simple manipulation
of the model that suggests a very useful way
of presenting the results of such an analysis.
One can manipulate equation (2), recogniz-















and η is a tax propensity used to adjust the
direct effect of the transfers on government
revenue for the fact that households spend
this extra income on taxed (or subsidized)
commodities, thus decreasing (increasing)
the amount of revenue that needs to be
raised to balance the budget. As earlier, dmh
(= drh) is the direct cash transfer to house-
hold h,Σhdmh is the program budget, and
βh is the social valuation of this transfer.
From equation (7), the total welfare im-
pact of a domestically financed transfer pro-
gram will thus depend on how this program
is financed and the government budget
balanced. The term ηΣhdmh tells us how
much revenue has to be raised to balance
the budget and λ is the social welfare cost
of raising one unit of this revenue. The wel-
fare impacts of any given financing strategy
operate through changes in commodity and
factor prices, and these are captured by the
indirect welfare impacts in equation (6).
Subsuming both these indirect welfare ef-
fects in equation (6) into one variable, dz,
and equating this term with the second term






Rearranging, we derive an expression for



















The term λI captures the distributional pat-
tern of the indirect income effects and is
essentially a weighted average of the share
of each household in the indirect income
changes with welfare weights as weighting
factors. The more progressive the distribu-
tional incidence of the indirect income ef-
fects, the lower this term and thus the social
welfare cost of financing the program. The
term ρ is a scale factor capturing the effi-
ciency implications (i.e., the combined real-
location and distortionary effects discussed
earlier) of domestic financing. This effi-
ciency ratio, ρ, is greater (less) than unity
if the domestic financing strategy results in
less (more) efficient patterns of production
and consumption, thus increasing (decreas-
ing) the social cost of financing the program.
Note also that λ is independent of how the
budget is spent and depends only on how
the budget is raised, whereas the opposite
holds for η.11
Combining equations (7) and (8), the
total welfare impact of introducing the cash-
transfer programs is given by:













and αh is the transfer received by household
h as a proportion of the transfer budget.
Thus λD (as with λI earlier) is a weighted
average of household βs since Σhα=1 and
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11As highlighted by Ballard et al. (1985), “differential incidence” studies focus on λ* whereas “balanced budget
incidence” studies focus on λ. In such studies, the use of “exhaustive expenditures” that do not enter into either
the utility function or production function can give misleading estimates of the efficiency cost of transfer pro-
grams, this bias depending on the magnitude of η.is higher the more progressive is the pattern
of program transfers.12
The total welfare of the cash-transfer
program can then be seen as depending di-
rectly on the difference between distribu-
tional incidence of the transfers minus the
product of the distributional incidence of the
tax burden associated with financing these
transfers times a factor capturing the degree
of inefficiency in the tax system. For exam-
ple, if the government is unconcerned about
income distribution (e.g., either because in-
comes are already equalized or ε=0) then
βh = 1(=β ) for all households and λD =λ I
= 1. If, in addition, the government can fi-
nance all its revenue requirements with
lump-sum transfers (i.e., using nondistor-
tionary tax instruments) then we have ρ=1.
The program then results in no overall
change in welfare. However, if instead the
transfers have to be financed by introducing
distortionary taxes then we have ρ>1 so
that the net welfare impact is negative owing
to an indirect distortionary effect capturing
the so-called “deadweight losses” associated
with taxes. If distortionary taxes already
existed then the size of ρ will depend on
whether these were optimally set or not and
which taxes (subsidies) are increased (de-
creased) to finance the program. If initially
taxes were set optimally then ρ>1 and wel-
fare decreases.13 If instead the program is
financed by the removal of distortionary
subsidies then ρ<1 and welfare increases.
If initially taxes were not set optimally then
ρ>1 (ρ<1) if the program is financed by
raising taxes that were initially too high
(low). In the presence of an inefficient tax
structure one also gets reallocation effects
if income elasticities differ across those
receiving and financing the budget. For ex-
ample, if the poor (who receive transfers)
have a relatively high propensity to con-
sume highly subsidized commodities from
extra income then this will increase ρ since
the net revenue costs of financing the pro-
gram will be greater. Finally, if ρ=1 for
any of the above reasons, then the welfare
impact of the program will depend on the
relative progressive incidence of the direct
and indirect income effects.
We are interested in determining the
overall welfare impact of the actual transfer
program but also in comparing across al-
ternatives. For example, in our illustration
below the actual program is the transfer pro-
gram financed by a reduction in food sub-
sidies and the alternatives reflect alternative
financing scenarios, namely, alternative re-
forms of the VAT system. To motivate the
manner in which we present our results, it is
useful to rearrange equation (7)′. Because the
transfer budget and the direct welfare im-
pact are common across all (i.e., the actual
and alternative) programs, one can equiva-
lently compare the welfare impacts by com-
paring the benefit–cost ratios of programs
defined as:




j is the welfare cost of raising rev-
enue to finance the program (i.e., one pa-
rameter for each of the actual and alternative
financing strategies, j) and λD is the welfare
benefit of that unit of revenue transferred to
households through program j. In principle
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12This term is analogous to what is commonly referred to as the “distributional characteristic” of policy instru-
ments (Feldstein 1974). See Coady and Skoufias (2004) for a detailed discussion of this partial equilibrium sta-
tistic and its relationship to other measures used in the literature.
13Optimal taxation requires that, for all taxes under the control of the policy maker, the deadweight loss from rais-
ing extra revenue (i.e., λ) is equalized across all tax instruments (see Myles 1995, Chapter 4; Coady and Drèze
2002).one should choose the program with the
highest θj > 1; that is, conditional on ben-
efits exceeding costs, one chooses the pro-
gram that exhibits the lowest welfare cost of
financing these benefits. In other words, θj
is the social return to every dollar raised to
finance the program. In the next chapter we
present results for λD, λ*
j, and θj across
alternative financing scenarios and different
degrees of aversion to inequality (i.e., values
of ε).
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The Computable General Equilibrium Model
and Policy Simulations
I
n this chapter we provide an illustration of the preceding approach by way of an evalua-
tion of the recent shift in policy emphasis in Mexico’s poverty alleviation strategy away
from universal food subsidies toward targeted cash transfers. To recap, the social account-
ing matrix (SAM) underlying the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the
Mexican economy is constructed using both Mexican household-level survey data as well as
sectoral and macro-aggregate data. The basic approach is to feed the transfers, equivalent to a
30 percent increase in the incomes of poor rural households, into the CGE model. This leads
to general equilibrium changes in commodity and factor prices. The resulting proportionate
changes in household incomes (γh) and commodity prices (ρi) are then superimposed on
household-level survey data to calculate the indirect changes in real incomes of each house-
hold (dzh). The direct transfers (drh = dmh) and these indirect income effects are then aggre-
gated using welfare weights to calculate λD, λI, and µ. Using equation (9), these three param-
eters are combined into a benefit–cost ratio (θj), one for each program characterized by
different domestic financing arrangements (i.e., removing food subsidies and different VATre-
form programs). This benefit–cost ratio acts as a sufficient statistic for comparing the relative
welfare impacts across alternative transfer programs. Given that the structure and size of the
direct transfers, and thus the overall program budget, are the same across all alternatives, one
can equivalently use λ* to compare across programs.
The general equilibrium impact of a transfer program on factor and commodity prices will
depend on the structure of the CGE model, the behavioral parameters that determine how eco-
nomic agents respond to these price changes, and the way in which the program is financed.
Below we present more detail on the structure of the CGE model and the SAM underlying its
construction as well as the different domestic financing arrangements considered. One can
think of three sets of parameters that determine how economic agents respond and how mar-
kets clear through price changes: consumption, production, and trade parameters. Below we
discuss these parameters in more detail. Because estimates of the large number of parameters
required are never available for any one country, these are taken from other studies and thus
should be treated as “guesstimates.”14As a result, to check the robustness of our conclusions,
we undertake sensitivity analysis over a range of consumption, production, and trade param-
eters. The base parameters are presented in the following section, as is the strategy for sensi-
14The sectoral parameters used are adapted from those used in a similar CGE model constructed by Bautista et
al. (2002).
12tivity analysis. The final section presents the
results from the policy simulations and sen-
sitivity analyses.
The Database and SAM
The CGE model used in this analysis relies
on a social accounting matrix (SAM) of
Mexico, based on 1996 data (see Harris
1999 for more details). The SAM accounts
for all income and expenditure transactions
of all sectors and institutions in the national
economy, and thus serves as the underlying
data framework for the CGE model.15 The
data were first collected as a national SAM,
which was then divided into five regions.
The model is able to capture differences
among the regions in terms of production
and consumption patterns, in a “top-down”
approach: rather than having complete re-
gional SAMs, the model regionally dis-
aggregates the national SAM only by
production and factor markets as well as
households.
The model includes four rural regions—
North, Central, Southwest, and Southeast—
which produce only primary agricultural
products.16 There is one “national” urban
region, which comprises all of the urban
areas of Mexico, regardless of geographic
location. The urban area produces pro-
cessed agricultural goods and other goods
and services. Appendix Table E.1 shows
which states are in each rural region. Gen-
erally, the North region produces more
high-valued agriculture, in particular fruits
and vegetables, much of which is exported.
Agriculture production relies on more irri-
gated land use, and households are wealth-
ier. The Southeast region is poorest, more of
the land used is non-irrigated, and there is
less commercial farming. The Central and
Southwest regions are a mixture of the first
two, with a range of subsistence and com-
mercial farming and agricultural technology.
These two areas also produce the largest
amounts of basic grains and beans.
The SAM and CGE model permit the
regionalization of agriculture. Each rural
region produces six agricultural activities:
maize, wheat, other grains, beans, fruits and
vegetables, and other crops. The model al-
lows for multiple production activities to
produce one national commodity. For ex-
ample, all four rural regions produce the
maize activity, which is supplied to a single
national maize commodity market. Thus
there are 24 agricultural activities but six
agricultural commodities. A given sector’s
production is differentiated among the re-
gions according to output levels and tech-
nology (in terms of factor and input usage).
The livestock/forestry/fishery sector is not
regionalized, owing to data limitations. The
urban region produces all other goods, in-
cluding processed agricultural goods. Ap-
pendix Table E.2 lists the sectors used in
the model.
There are four types of non-agricultural
labor: professional, white-collar, blue-collar,
and unskilled/informal (referred to in this
report as unskilled), and four agricultural
labor categories, differentiated by region.
The agricultural activities employ only agri-
cultural labor and non-agricultural activi-
ties do not use any agricultural labor. Each
rural region uses two types of land, irrigated
and non-irrigated, for a total of eight land
types. There is one capital category, used
by all sectors. The model may be thought
of as medium-term in nature, as labor is
mobile across sectors, but capital and land
are not.
Each region has three households, de-
fined as poor, medium, or rich according
to the income tercile into which they fall.
The delineation among the categories comes
from national data. In this way, distributional
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15For a detailed discussion of SAMs, see Pyatt and Round (1985).
16The definition of “rural” used in this model is somewhat different from the standard. Here we use an urban–
rural cutoff set at 15,000 individuals.impacts of different scenarios can be ob-
served among income groups as well as
among the regions. The rural regions get
labor income from all labor types, distrib-
uted according to national survey data. Poor
rural households receive 45 percent of the
agricultural returns to dry land in their
region, while medium rural households re-
ceive 55 percent of dry land income. All of
the irrigated land payments go to the rich
households. The land returns (to dry land)
for the livestock/forestry/fishery sector are
split among the medium and rich rural house-
holds. Rural households also receive capi-
tal income indirectly through enterprises.
This income is calculated as the residual
between income and expenditure. Urban
households do not receive any income from
agricultural labor; the other labor categories
distribute payments to the households ac-
cording to shares given in the national sur-
vey. Urban households do not receive any
land income and, like their rural counter-
parts, receive capital payments via the enter-
prise account. Household consumption pat-
terns also come from the survey data. Rural
households have home consumption of the
agricultural goods produced in their respec-
tive regions; all other goods are bought on
the national market. All households save ac-
cording to parameters estimated from house-
hold survey data.
There is a clear trade-off between the
income and spatial disaggregations in the
model. Ceteris paribus, expanding either
dimension results in much smaller data
cells and less reliable data on, for example,
the shares of different income sources or
the patterns of expenditures. This suggests
two possible strategies: (1) use more re-
gional categories (say, five) and fewer in-
come groups (say, three), or (2) use fewer
regional categories (say, two) and more in-
come groups (say, five). In our model we
used the former approach in order to capture
important regional diversity in terms of in-
come shares and expenditure patterns. How-
ever, this simple description gives a mis-
leadingly pessimistic view of the trade-off
in terms of disaggregation across income
groups. In reality we have substantially more
disaggregation because, from the perspec-
tive of the potential for differential income
effects, we have 15 household groups (i.e.,
three income groups times five regions),
each of which can experience different in-
come effects arising from some given pol-
icy change because of their varying income
sources and expenditure patterns. When
combined with a greater disaggregation
across income groups in the households
data, the effective degree of disaggregation
is much higher than three groups. Appendix
Table E.3 shows the regional distribution of
households across national income deciles.
The government and the enterprise ac-
count already alluded to are the other do-
mestic institutions in the SAM. The govern-
ment, which is national, collects seven types
of taxes: a value-added tax, a producer tax,
an export tax, a sales tax, an import tariff, a
payroll tax, and an income tax. It receives
transfers from the rest of the world and pro-
vides transfers to households and enterprises.
The rest of the world account provides
transfers to households, buys Mexico’s ex-
ports, and sells its imports.
With the data for the SAM coming from
so many disparate sources, it is not surpris-
ing that its initial construction was neither
balanced nor consistent. The SAM was
therefore balanced using maximum entropy
techniques to incorporate prior knowledge
in a consistent way.17 In Appendix Table E.4
we present some useful summary statistics
of the data used in the analysis; the tax
rates are important because all the indirect
welfare and revenue effects result from the
existence of these tax distortions and the
trade statistics show the importance of inter-
national trade in equilibrating demand and
supply.
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CGE Model
The computable general equilibrium model
used in this study follows the sectoral and
socioeconomic structure of the SAM de-
scribed in the preceding section. The CGE
model is neoclassical in spirit, with agents
responding to price changes. The model is
Walrasian, determining only relative prices.
Product prices, factor prices, and the equi-
librium exchange rate are defined relative
to the consumer price index, which serves as
the price numeraire. The country is “small”
in the sense that it takes world prices as
given.
Households receive income from factor
payments (land, labor, and capital payments)
net of factor taxes, government transfers, and
transfers from the rest of the world. They
consume goods according to a linear expen-
diture function (LES), purchasing goods
from the market as well as from home pro-
duction (in rural areas only). Household
consumption demand is modeled as a mod-





where the subscript i refers to commodities,
C is total household consumption, γ is sub-
sistence consumption, and φ is the marginal
propensity to consume each commodity.
Total consumption is taken from the SAM
database and marginal budget shares are
taken from estimates in the literature. Sub-
sistence consumption levels are used to cal-
ibrate the model. We also test the sensitivity
of our results to alternative values for φ.
Households also pay taxes on their mon-
etary income and save a share of their total
income. Enterprises serve as the conduit
between the capital factor account and the
other institutions (households, government,
and the rest of the world). They receive cap-
ital income minus capital payments to the
rest of the world, as well as government
transfers. Enterprises transfer that payment,
net of depreciation and taxes, to households.
Government income is the sum of all taxes:
direct taxes on households and enterprises,
value-added taxes, producer taxes, import
tariffs, export taxes, social security taxes,
and sales taxes. The government consumes
commodities according to fixed shares
(given in the SAM) and also spends money
on producer subsidies, transfers to domestic
institutions, and transfers to the rest of the
world.
The production technology is a nested
function of a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion (for factors within value added) and
Leontief functions (for intermediate inputs
and total value added).18At the top level, do-
mestic output is a linear combination of
value-added and intermediate inputs. The
value-added function for each commodity
is modeled as a CES function of the primary
factors of production (the land types, labor







where the superscript  v refers to value
added, the subscript f denotes factors, V is
total value added, αv is an efficiency pa-
rameter, δf is a value-added share parameter
for each factor, F is the quantity demanded
of each factor, and ρf is a transformation of
the elasticity of factor substitution (i.e., the
smaller ρf the higher this elasticity and the
larger the optimal change in the ratios be-
tween different factor quantities in response
to changes in factor prices). Intermediate
input demand is determined according to
fixed input–output coefficients. The com-
modity output is a composite of different
activities, which are imperfectly substitut-
able: thus this framework allows multiple
activities to produce one commodity, as
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18In the equations that follow we drop commodity subscripts for convenience.discussed in the SAM description. We test
the sensitivity of our results to alternative
values for factor elasticities.
Producers of exportables decide to sup-
ply their output to either the export or do-
mestic market according to a constant
elasticity of transformation (CET) function,
which permits some degree of indepen-
dence from international prices:
Y =α e[δeEρe + (1 – δe)Dρ e]— 1
ρe
where the superscript e refers to exporta-
bles, Y is domestic production of the com-
modity, αe is a CET shift parameter, δe is a
share parameter, E is the quantity of ex-
ports, and D is the quantity sold in the do-
mestic market. The elasticity of transforma-
tion is calculated as Ωe = (1/1 – ρe), varying
from zero to infinity as the value of ρevaries
from infinity to unity. Similarly, importables
(m) are modeled as a constant elasticity of
substitution function of imported and do-
mestically produced commodities. This ag-
gregation, known as the Armington function,
permits imperfect substitutability between
imported and domestically produced goods,
and, therefore, two-way trade. We test the
sensitivity of our results to alternative value
of Ωe and Ωm.
Macroclosure refers to the four macro-
economic accounts that must be balanced in
the CGE model: the current account with the
rest of the world, the government account,
the savings–investment account, and the fac-
tor markets. In each condition, there are vari-
ables that serve to equilibrate the equation.
The current account can be balanced by ei-
ther the foreign savings variable or the ex-
change rate. This study chooses the latter, so
that the welfare changes are not influenced
by changes in foreign inflows. The choice of
government budget closure will depend on
the simulation being performed; in all cases,
government savings (or dissavings, as the
case may be), will be held fixed, as will real
government spending. One of the tax instru-
ments will be free to adjust to keep govern-
ment savings at its baseline level. This will
allow us to perform government budget-
neutral experiments without having gov-
ernment purchases of goods and services
affect the welfare analysis. Similarly, in the
savings–investment balance, real invest-
ment will be held fixed, and the marginal
propensities to save are adjusted proportion-
ally to equilibrate the account. In the factor
markets, labor and land are mobile across
sectors (within a region) and capital is fixed,
giving the model a medium-term time frame.
The preceding gives a general descrip-
tion of the model structure. In Appendix B
we present a more detailed discussion of a
number of important features of the model,
namely, the Armington treatment of im-
ports, the price equations, and the LES con-
sumption behavior. Appendix C presents a
list of the variables included in the model
and Appendix D contains a complete listing
of the CGE equations.
General Equilibrium
Simulations
In this section we briefly discuss the impact
of each of the policy simulations on macro-
economic, sectoral, and regional flows. Two
different types of simulations are performed
with the CGE model to experiment with
different ways of raising the money needed
to pay for the cash-transfer program. In the
first, consumer subsidies are removed to fi-
nance the transfer. The second set of simu-
lations experiments with different types of
value-added tax (VAT) reforms.
In the base run, the government deficit is
12 billion pesos.19 The CGE model is pro-
grammed to keep this number constant. In
each simulation, the method of “closing”
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19The exchange rate in 1996 was around US$1 = 10 pesos.the budget must take into account the gen-
eral equilibrium consequences of the trans-
fer. For example, although the direct cost of
the program is 57 billion pesos, it may be
that increased (or decreased) tax revenues
from the second-round effects of the trans-
fer decrease (or increase) the amount of
revenue the government needs in order to
keep its budget constant. The model adjusts
for this through one of the equilibrating tax
variables, specified later. The results (i.e.,
proportional income and price changes) used
for our following discussion of the channels
through which general equilibrium effects
flow under the various scenarios, are pre-
sented in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 gives the
resulting changes in factor prices and the
exchange rate.
Subsidies
In the base run of the model, subsidies on
Manufactured Maize, Manufactured Wheat,
and Dairy Manufacturing imply a consumer
subsidy on these goods of 25 percent, 20 
percent and 20 percent, respectively.20
These subsidies cost about 58 billion pesos,
so their removal can be used to finance the
PROGRESA transfer. In the experiment, the
THE COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL AND POLICY SIMULATIONS 17
20In 1996, the base year of the model, most consumer subsidies had already been abolished. This model augments
the subsidies on these three goods in an attempt to re-create the pre-reform environment and show the effects of
removing those subsidies to pay for the transfers, as did occur in reality.
Table 3.1 CGE changes in nominal income (percentage from base)
VAT adjustmentsb
Households Transfera Subsidy PVAT TVAT SVAT HVAT BVAT
North
Poor 30 26.20 24.61 23.97 23.65 24.93 23.91
Medium –4.61 –2.58 –3.08 –4.81 –2.24 –4.43
Rich –8.62 –0.46 –1.72 –9.22 0.17 –7.79
Central
Poor 30 28.15 25.64 24.7 24.24 26.08 24.65
Medium –3.07 –2.55 –3.16 –4.64 –2.19 –4.25
Rich –8.64 1.16 0.46 –7.04 1.50 –5.81
Southwest
Poor 30 26.62 26.16 24.98 23.03 26.66 23.73
Medium –3.34 –2.87 –3.70 –5.50 –2.49 –4.96
Rich –3.90 –3.79 –4.41 –6.50 –3.55 –5.99
Southeast
Poor 30 27.14 26.19 25.14 23.89 26.73 24.43
Medium –2.93 –3.31 –3.96 –4.46 –2.89 –4.20
Rich –1.91 –3.10 –3.97 –3.80 –2.62 –3.52
Urban
Poor –1.85 –4.31 –4.73 –3.52 –4.04 –3.55
Medium –1.62 –3.76 –4.10 –3.08 –3.59 –3.10
Rich –1.47 –3.27 –3.55 –2.55 –3.20 –2.58
a The program gives a direct cash transfer to poor households in rural areas, equivalent to a 30 percent increase
in nominal incomes. Poor, medium, and rich correspond to income terciles. The final six columns present the
net income effects under each of the six alternative financing strategies.
b See Table 3.3 for an explanation of VAT experiments. The subsidy and tax simulations are discussed in detail
in the text in the third section of this chapter.income tax, which is modeled as a lump sum
tax, serves as the equilibrating variable for
the government budget and it falls very
slightly. Removing the distorting subsidies
causes an improvement in the macroeco-
nomic accounts, with consumption increas-
ing three quarters of a percent and GDP and
absorption rising by one half of one percent.
At the micro level, the decreased subsi-
dies directly lead to decreases in production
of the formerly subsidized goods, and as a
consequence, the output of their interme-
diate goods (raw Maize, Wheat, and Live-
stock, in particular) also falls. This causes
resources to shift to the other agricultural
goods, and in fact, overall agricultural out-
put increases because resources are now
allocated more efficiently. As a result, there
is downward pressure on the wage and
rental returns of most agricultural factors of
production—the exceptions are agricultural
labor in the Central region, where the labor-
intensive  Beans production experiences a
large increase in output, and irrigated land
in the Southeast region, where Other Crops
has a relatively larger increase in output.
The fact that most rural factors now receive
lower payments explains in large part the
decline in nonbeneficiary rural household
income as well as why beneficiary house-
holds end up receiving less than the full
amount of the income transfer.
The urban area’s production contracts
by one half of a percentage point as a result
of the policy. This is attributable mainly to
the decrease in production of the processed
foods which were formerly protected. Thus,
all urban factors of production receive lower
payments, which leads to a decline in urban
household incomes. This also negatively
impacts rural households owing to their
reliance on urban factor income.
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Table 3.2 CGE changes in factor prices (percentage from base)
VAT adjustmentsa
Factors Subsidy PVAT TVAT SVAT HVAT BVAT
Labor
Agr–North –8.43 2.66 2.14 –8.93 2.94 –7.30
Agr–Central 6.64 1.16 0.68 –7.57 1.40 –6.32
Agr–Southwest –5.54 2.25 1.73 –8.82 2.2 –7.25
Agr–Southeast –3.53 1.97 1.42 –8.77 2.26 –7.24
Professional –1.16 –3.13 –3.77 –3.46 –2.90 –3.24
White collar –1.00 –3.19 –3.36 –2.52 –3.20 –2.55
Blue collar –1.44 –2.93 –2.98 –2.62 –3.02 –2.64
Unskilled –1.38 –2.78 –2.90 –3.28 –2.82 –3.16
Land
Dry–North –12.11 4.09 3.67 –8.18 4.29 –6.46
Dry–Central –9.70 3.37 2.86 –8.93 3.63 –7.19
Dry–Southwest –14.43 4.47 3.97 –8.38 4.73 –6.58
Dry–Southeast –7.46 2.64 2.09 –8.73 2.94 –7.12
Irrig–North –12.87 3.10 2.53 –9.47 3.41 –7.70
Irrig–Central –15.06 2.48 1.88 –10.32 2.82 –8.53
Irrig–Southwest –18.21 2.93 2.33 –10.55 3.27 –8.67
Irrig–Southeast 2.54 –0.40 –1.00 –9.64 –0.08 –8.31
Capital –1.67 –2.96 –3.40 –2.71 –2.86 –2.60
Exchange rateb –1.00 +1.00 0.00 0.00 +1.00 0.00
a See Table 3.3 for explanation of VAT experiments.
b An increase in the exchange rate is a depreciation.Value-Added Taxes
The base data have three levels of the
value-added tax (VAT):21 all raw agricul-
tural goods, processed agricultural goods,
and food have a VAT rate of zero; the “mid-
dle” VAT rate is imposed on Light Manu-
facturing, Intermediate Goods, and Profes-
sional Services at 5 percent; and the “high”
VAT rate is on Capital Goods, Consumer
Durables, Construction, and  Commerce,
Trade, and Transportation, equaling 10 per-
cent. The VAT is adjusted in five ways
to raise the revenue needed to fund the
PROGRESA transfer. In the first experiment
(PVAT), the VAT is raised proportionally on
all goods, which causes the middle VATrate
to increase to 7.3 percent and the higher
rate to increase to 14.6 percent. Next, the
VAT is increased only for those goods with
the upper rate, rising to 16.1 percent (HVAT).
Third, the VAT is increased and made uni-
form for the goods which initially had a VAT
imposed on them, with the resulting new
rate equal to 11.4 percent (TVAT). Then, the
VAT is increased and made uniform for the
goods that initially had either zero VAT or
the middle rate, so that these goods are now
subject to a 7.2 percent VAT, while the high
VAT rate remains at 10 percent (BVAT).
Finally, the VAT is adjusted so that it is uni-
form for all goods, including the ones that
were previously exempt, for a single VAT
rate of 8.3 percent (SVAT). See Table 3.3 for
a summary of these experiments.
Two of the VAT experiments slightly
improve the macroeconomic indicators,
namely, the uniform increase of the zero and
low-VAT goods (i.e., BVAT), and the uni-
form increase of all goods (i.e., SVAT). The
resulting VAT structures from these experi-
ments are less distorting than from the other
experiments. On the other hand, because
these two VAT changes increase the VAT
rate on agricultural products, agricultural
factors of production suffer from lower re-
turns. For example, when the VAT is made
uniform for all activities, agricultural wages
fall by between 7.6 percent and 8.9 percent,
and land returns fall by between 8.2 percent
and 10.6 percent. This then dampens the
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21These data do not reflect actual VAT rates because they are imposed on composite production goods, the indi-
vidual components of which may have different rates and may include exports (which are zero-rated). Thus the
rates must be interpreted as average VAT rates for these aggregated sectors.
Table 3.3 Description of VAT experiments
VAT Middle ratec
experiment Descriptiona Low rateb (percentages) High rated
Base — 0 5.0 10
PVAT Proportional increase in base VAT rates 0 7.3 14.6
HVAT Increase in high rate only 0 5.0 16.1
TVAT Uniform top rate 0 11.4 11.4
BVAT Uniform bottom rate 7.2 7.2 10
SVAT Single rate 8.3 8.3 8.3
a The subsidy reforms are discussed in the text in the third section and involve removing the subsidies on manu-
factured maize flour (25 percent), manufactured wheat flour (20 percent), and dairy manufactures (20 percent).
b Low rate is applied to all raw agricultural, processed agricultural, and other food activities.
c Middle rate is applied to Light Manufacturing, Intermediate Goods, and Professional Services activities.
d High rate is applied to Capital Goods, Consumer Durables, Construction, and Commerce, Trade, and Trans-
portation activities.income gains to recipient households, by
about 5.5 percent to 6.5 percent in either
experiment. The increase in the VAT for the
sectors that originally had a low VAT de-
creases payments to the urban factors,
which hurts both urban and rural household
income.
The other three VAT experiments are
more inefficient, as evidenced by the slight
decline in macroeconomic indicators. How-
ever, because raw agricultural production
and processed agriculture is not taxed, the
increased demand for these products raises
the agricultural wages in all three experi-
ments. This does not imply that beneficiary
household incomes increase beyond the
transfer payment, because of their reliance
on urban factor income. The VAT lowers
urban wages by more in these scenarios, be-
cause urban sector production is harder hit,
and this negatively impacts all rural house-
holds, including the beneficiaries. However,
their income changes are still higher than in
the two VAT simulations mentioned earlier.
Also, as expected, urban households see even
greater decreases in their income with the
more distorting VAT systems, as the VAT
rates are now higher for the goods from
which they receive factor income.
Welfare Evaluation of 
Policy Simulations
In this section we very briefly summarize
our policy simulations and then evaluate
their impacts on welfare. To recap, our ap-
proach involves taking the indirect welfare
impacts from the CGE analysis and super-
imposing them on the household-level data.
The program is modeled as a poverty alle-
viation program that transfers income to
“poor” households in rural areas, equivalent
to a 30 percent increase in their nominal
incomes and 2 percent of aggregate con-
sumption. The total welfare impact of such
a program will depend on how it is financed,
and we consider a number of alternatives.
The basic approach is to compare the social
costs of raising the necessary revenue to fi-
nance the program (the adjusted “cost of
public funds,” λ*
j) with those of the actual
financing instrument, that is, the elimination
of food subsidies, as well as with the pro-
gram benefit (i.e., λD).
The results of our simulations are pre-
sented in Table 3.4, for the range of welfare
weights used throughout the analysis (i.e.,
ε=0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 5.0). We start by com-
paring the cost of public funds across alter-
native financing packages for ε=0, that is,
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Table 3.4 Social cost of public funds
Cost of raising a unit of revenue (λ λ*
j )a
Inequality Benefit Food PVAT HVAT TVAT BVAT SVAT
aversionb (λ λD) subsidies (0, 7.5, 15) (0, 5, 16) (0, 11) (7, 10) (8.3)
ε=0 1 0.625 1.061 1.071 1.051 0.969 0.955
ε=0.5 1.242 0.468 0.732 0.751 0.718 0.668 0.685
ε=1 1.584 0.397 0.611 0.633 0.602 0.560 0.599
ε=2 2.792 0.395 0.658 0.679 0.664 0.612 0.69
ε=3 5.448 0.557 1.023 1.045 1.054 0.970 1.109
ε=4 11.549 0.996 1.962 1.988 2.042 1.882 2.155
ε=5 26.011 2.060 4.227 4.263 4.425 4.082 4.671
a See Table 3.3 for details of VAT structures before and after the program. The numbers in parentheses indicate
the rates after financing the program. The program involves transfers to “poor” households (i.e., those in the
bottom third of the national income distribution) equivalent to a 30 percent increase in their nominal incomes.
b The value ε=0 indicates no distributional concerns with aversion for inequality captured by ε>0, with ε=5
incorporating the greatest concern for poorest households. The same values are used throughout the analysis.where we are concerned only with the effi-
ciency aspects of the program and not with
its impact on the distribution of income or
poverty. It is clear that, from an efficiency
perspective, financing the program by re-
ducing subsidies dominates, with the cost
of raising 100 pesos being only 62 pesos. In
other words, every 100 pesos raised to fi-
nance the program increases welfare (and
GDP) by 38 pesos. These substantial wel-
fare gains result from the elimination of a
highly distortionary subsidy. This compares
extremely favorably with the alternative
forms of VAT financing.
Two of the VAT alternatives, that is,
SVATand BVAT, also result in welfare gains,
with the cost of raising 100 pesos being 95
pesos if financed by a move to a single uni-
form VAT rate or 97 pesos if financed by a
move toward a uniform VAT rate in the place
of the bottom two rates. These efficiency
gains arise from the reform in the VAT
structure. In general, the inefficiency associ-
ated with a tax system is minimized by hav-
ing relatively higher rates on commodities
with relatively low own-price elasticities of
demand.22 Because basic food items tend to
have low price elasticities, shifting taxes
toward these commodities will tend to in-
crease welfare and this is what happens in
both the case of SVAT and BVAT. Our re-
sults tell us that the gains resulting from
thus reforming the VAT structure outweigh
the welfare losses from the higher average
rate required to finance the program.
The other VAT alternatives considered
all have a cost of public funds greater than
unity, ranging between 105 and 107 pesos
per 100 pesos of revenue raised. All of these
involve an increase in the VAT rates of one
or both of the top two VAT rates and the
commodities falling within these rates tend
to be the most price elastic. These welfare
losses mean that, in the absence of any so-
cial value being attached to any improve-
ment in the income distribution, such a
program would be welfare decreasing.
However, not only are distributional con-
cerns the motivating force for the program
in the first place, but they also tend to be the
motivation behind tax structures that exhibit
high tax rates on low price-elastic luxuries
typically consumed disproportionately by
higher-income households. Therefore, any
evaluation of the program should explicitly
address this issue.
Introducing distributional concerns in-
volves analyzing the results for values of
ε>0. The cost of public funds for a number
of financing instruments is presented in Fig-
ure 3.1: in order to avoid clutter we focus
on only three of the VAT alternatives, that
is, the most inefficient system (HVAT) and
the two most efficient systems (BVAT and
SVAT), along with subsidy financing. The
first thing to notice is that even for low aver-
sions to inequality (e.g., ε=0.5) the cost
of raising a peso becomes substantially less
than one peso for all financing instru-
ments.23 This reflects the fact that the indi-
rect income effects are distributed in favor
of the poor at the expense of the nonpoor.
The second thing to notice is that the rela-
tionship between the cost of public funds
and ε is U-shaped, with the former begin-
ning to rise after ε=1. Eventually, at around
ε=3, the cost of public funds goes above
unity. This pattern indicates that although
the tax incidence is lowest for the poor as
a whole, it is relatively high for the poorest
of the poor, and the greater the weight we
place on the income of the poorest the
higher the social cost of raising revenue
through the alternative VAT instruments.
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22We are implicitly assuming that cross-price elasticities are zero or sufficiently small as to make this general rule
of thumb valid. See, for example, Coady and Drèze (2002) and Myles (1995) for more detailed discussion.
23A similar result was found by Ballard (1988) for the United States. Note that an adjusted cost of public funds
greater (less) than unity means that the total welfare impact per unit program expenditure is less (greater) than
that suggested by focusing exclusively on the direct impact on welfare.Although the cost of financing the pro-
gram through reducing subsidies follows
the same U-shaped pattern, it remains the
most attractive form of finance throughout.
In fact, for higher values of ε, it also appears
to be the least regressive form of financing.
This is brought out clearly in Figure 3.2
which shows the benefit–cost ratios (BCRs)
across the instruments discussed in the pre-
ceding. The higher the value of ε the more
attractive subsidy reductions look relative to
VAT financing. For example, at only mod-
erate levels of aversion to income inequal-
ity, the BCR with subsidy financing is about
four, that is, every 100 pesos raised to fi-
nance the program increases welfare by 400
pesos, a very high social return by any stan-
dard. But even the BCRs for VAT financ-
ing increase monotonically with ε reflecting
the very high targeting performance of the
transfers at poor households.24 This brings
out one of the main attractions of the pro-
gram, that is, the fact that it is very effi-
ciently targeted. More generally, it indicates
the potential return in welfare terms from
introducing a more efficiently targeted trans-
fer program. The presence of such a pro-
gram enables one to design a more efficient
tax system by lessening the need to trade
off efficiency goals against equity objectives,
for example, by reducing the need for high
subsidies on necessities or high taxes on
price-elastic luxuries that exist for equity
reasons. More generally, it is also clear that
the indirect cost of the transfer program can
be substantially reduced if the program
can be combined with reform of an initially
inefficient tax system.
We finish by discussing the sensitivity
of our results to alternative values for the
more important underlying parameters in
the model. We focus on three sets of pa-
rameters: (1) the marginal budget shares, φ;
(2) the elasticity of factor substitution, σf =
(1/1 – ρf); and (3d) the elasticity of trans-
formation between domestically produced
tradables and their traded alternatives, Ωe =
(1/1 – ρe) and Ωm = (1/1 – ρm). In the case
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24The very good targeting performance reflects, of course, the fact that by construction only poor rural house-
holds receive transfers. However, note also that some very poor urban households are left out of the program. We
look at this spatial pattern of welfare impacts in the next chapter.
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Figure 3.1 Cost of public fundsof the marginal budget shares, we both in-
crease and decrease the φ for foods by 10
percent, allowing those for other goods to
adjust accordingly to meet the additivity
constraint that all φs sum to unity. In the
case of factor and trade elasticities, we both
increase and decrease these by 20 percent
from the base run. Each of these three sets
of sensitivity analyses are undertaken sepa-
rately. For clarity, we also focus solely on
the actual financing strategy, that is, the
removal of food subsidies.
In Figure 3.3a–c, for each of the above
we compare the (adjusted) cost of public
funds for different values of ε (i.e., inequal-
ity aversion). In all cases we observe an
almost identical pattern across various
values of ε: the cost of public funds starts
off below unity, then falls as ε increases and
eventually rises for higher values of ε above
unity. Given that our sensitivity analyses
cover a wide range for the model parame-
ters, these results suggest that our main pol-
icy conclusions are very robust.
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Figure 3.3c Sensitivity to trade elasticities (subsidy removal simulation)CHAPTER 4
The Spatial Distribution of Welfare Impacts
I
n this chapter we make use of the spatial disaggregation within the CGE model to evalu-
ate how the transfer program differentially impacts different regions of the country. The
welfare impact of such transfers can be expected to vary substantially across regions
both because poverty (and thus the level of cash transfers) varies spatially but also because the
indirect general equilibrium welfare effects can vary spatially. The former reflects program de-
sign features, whereas the nature of the latter depends on such things as nature of consump-
tion and production patterns across households and regions, the regional structure of factor and
commodity markets and the mechanisms through which equilibrium is restored in these mar-
kets, and the ways in which the program is financed.
Information on the likely differential regional welfare impacts is important for a number
of reasons. For example, the regional distribution of the welfare impacts is potentially impor-
tant from a political economy perspective in determining political support for the program.
Similarly, because of differential regional impacts, the distribution of poverty after the pro-
gram may differ from that before the program and such information can be extremely impor-
tant for the design of other components of the poverty alleviation strategy.
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section we briefly discuss the methodol-
ogy used for evaluating the differential regional welfare (and poverty) impacts of the transfers
and also present a brief picture of the situation prior to the introduction of cash transfers. In
the second section we present our results on the regional distribution of the welfare impact
of the transfers. The final section presents a summary and conclusion.
The Level and Distribution of Welfare before the Program
In this section we present a very brief description of the spatial distribution of social welfare
in Mexico prior to the reforms under consideration. This will provide a reference point from
which to evaluate the spatial impact of the reforms on social welfare. Our analysis uses the
1996 nationally representative household survey data and our indicator of welfare is adult-
equivalent household per capita expenditure (henceforth referred to as consumption or in-
come) denoted by y.
The methodology we apply is to think of welfare (W) as being the product of the mean
level of consumption, µ, and some measure of inequality, I, as follows (Deaton 1997, Chap-
ter 3):
W =µ(1 – I)
where Wis increasing in mean consumption but decreasing in the index of inequality. This for-
mulation captures the standard notion of a trade-off between efficiency and inequality, that is,
25we are willing to trade off a lower mean for
a more equal distribution or vice versa.
Proportional changes (or differences) in
welfare can then be decomposed additively
into the proportional change (difference)
in mean income minus the proportional
change (difference) in an index of inequal-
ity. This, of course, is directly analogous to
our comparisons of benefit–cost ratios for
the alternative programs in the previous
chapter since, in equation (9), these are de-
rived as the product of the relative progres-
siveness of the direct and indirect income
changes from the program times an effi-
ciency parameter that captures the change
in aggregate income.
To be consistent with the welfare analy-
sis in Chapter 3, for our measure of inequal-
ity we use the Atkinson index, which has a
basis in standard welfare theory. This index
can be derived from an additive social wel-
fare function as:







for ε≠1. For ε=1 one can use the multi-
plicative form:




where µ is mean income and, as in Chap-
ter 2, ε≥0 captures ones degree of aver-
sion to inequality in the income distribution,
that is, our willingness to make a trade-off
between mean income and inequality. The
welfare weights underlying this social wel-
fare function are exactly those used in the
previous chapters.25
To be comparable and consistent with
our CGE analysis, in the household data
set we group households into five re-
gions: (1) North, (2) Central, (3) Southwest,
(4) Southeast, and (5) Urban. The distribu-
tion of all households across regions is pre-
sented in Table 4.1. One can see that more
than one half of the population live in the
urban areas and Urban’s even higher share
of total income is consistent with a higher
productivity of labor. Urban and North have
the highest mean income and Southeast has
the lowest. However, these two wealthier re-
gions also have the most unequal distribution
of income. Notice also that their inequality
ranking switches as we go from I(ε=0.5) to
I(ε=1), consistent with income in North
being especially unequally distributed at the
lower end of the distribution. Decompos-
ing by region, we found that differences in
mean incomes across states account for only
around 15 percent to 20 percent of total
income inequality (with this proportion in-
creasing in ε), indicating a substantial in-
equality of income within regions.26
The above pattern of mean income and
inequality has the implication that our spa-
tial ranking by welfare can in principle de-
pend on our aversion to inequality. However,
in the present case, it is fairly obvious that
the differences in means will dominate the
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25 See Atkinson (1970) for details, and also Deaton (1997) for a useful discussion on this approach. This Atkin-
son index can be written as I = 1 – (ye / µ), where ye is the “equally distributed equivalent income,” that is, the
amount of income that if distributed equally would result in the same level of social welfare as the existing dis-
tribution of income. Because social welfare is decreasing in inequality we have ye <µ , with their ratio decreas-
ing the greater our aversion to inequality (i.e., the higher ε). So ye already encapsulates the concern for unequal
distribution. For this reason, I is often referred to as an “index of waste” because it captures the amount of social
welfare lost through not having an equal distribution of income. The index takes the value zero either when in-
come is equally distributed (with everyone having mean income so that ye =µ ) or when we are unconcerned about
the distribution of income (i.e., ε=0), in which case social welfare is adequately captured by focusing only on
mean income.
26The Atkinson index is not additively decomposable. However, the same pattern is displayed by other decompos-
able inequality measures such as the Theil index and other members of the general entropy family of inequality
indices. See Cowell (1995) and Kakwani (1980) for detailed discussion of alternative indices of inequality.differences in inequality levels (over plau-
sible value for ε) with the result that the
ranking by mean income gives simultane-
ously the welfare rankings. This is indeed
borne out by our welfare index.
For completeness, we also present a brief
“poverty profile” for Mexico. Although we
expect this profile to mimic the preceding
welfare discussion, it is useful also to have
a picture of the distribution of poverty be-
cause we are essentially using the poverty
criterion as our “targeting rule” for deter-
mining who gets transfers and who does
not. In this sense, we are using the poverty
analysis in a “positive” as opposed to a
“normative” manner. Assuming that one
third of Mexicans are “poor,” we identify
poor households as those in the bottom ter-
cile of the income distribution. As this may
be viewed as a relatively generous poverty
line, we describe poverty using a range of
indices that capture varying degrees of aver-
sion to the “severity of poverty.” By con-
struction, the national headcount index
(i.e., the percentage of households falling
below the poverty line) is 33.3 percent,
although this can vary by region, and by de-
sign will be affected by the reforms to be
analyzed later. We also present the “poverty
gap,” which (unlike the headcount index)
measures the depth of poverty and, if mul-
tiplied by the poverty line, gives the in-
crease in the mean income of poor house-
holds required to eliminate poverty com-
pletely. This should of course be interpreted
as the minimum required, as the elimina-
tion of poverty with this “budget” would also
require it to be “optimally” allocated (e.g.,
with zero “leakage” or “under-coverage”)
and, even then, it ignores any deadweight
losses (or incentive effects) associated
with the policy instruments used to transfer
income and to finance these transfers. Fi-
nally, we also present the “severity index,”
which attaches a greater weight to house-
holds the further they are below the poverty
line.27
Using this relative poverty line (which
comes out at just below 657 pesos in terms
of household per capita adult equivalent
consumption), we categorize households as
poor and nonpoor. The distribution of poor
households across regions is presented in
Table 4.2. Using the headcount ratio (i.e.,
the proportion of households classified as
poor) we find that within rural areas more
than one half of households in both Central
and Southeast are classified as poor and just
over 53 percent of the poor are found in
these two regions. Whereas only 18 percent
of urban households are classified as poor,
nearly 29 percent of the poor are found in
urban areas. So although a relatively high
percentage of rural households are poor,
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Table 4.1 Inequality profile using ENIGH96
Atkinson inequality indices
Population Mean Income Welfare
Region ε ε = = 0.5 ε ε = = 1.0 ε ε = = 2.0 share income share index (ε ε = = 2)
North 0.182 0.291 0.437 0.060 1,349 0.057 759
Central 0.141 0.251 0.411 0.152 878 0.093 517
Southwest 0.137 0.248 0.417 0.086 975 0.059 568
Southeast 0.14 0.25 0.411 0.166 782 0.091 460
Urban 0.169 0.293 0.462 0.536 1,868 0.7 1,005
All regions 0.187 0.323 0.506 1 1,429 1 706
Note: The welfare index is calculated by multiplying mean income by 1 minus the relevant inequality index.there is still a substantial number of poor
located in urban areas. This is important
because, in the reforms to be evaluated later,
the poverty alleviation budget is targeted
only to rural areas.
The total poverty gap (i.e., the sum of
household poverty gaps) comes out at 76
pesos per household (or 5.3 percent of
aggregate income) so that a 5.3 percent in-
crease in mean incomes, with the proceeds
allocated optimally over only poor house-
holds, would be required to eliminate poverty
completely.28 In comparison, the poverty
alleviation budget constitutes around 2 per-
cent of total income. Alternatively, the alle-
viation of poverty would require an optimal
lump-sum transfer from the nonpoor (who
account for 90 percent of total income)
equivalent to 5.9 percent of their income.29
More than 81 percent of this gap is concen-
trated in rural areas, especially in the Cen-
tral and Southeast regions. The “poverty
shares” of these two regions (and of South-
west) increase in moving from the poverty
gap to using the severity index, suggesting
that the poorest households are also located
in these rural areas.
The Spatial Distribution of
Welfare after the Program
We now decompose the total welfare impact
of the program in terms of its spatial pattern.
The results are presented in Table 4.3, but
also in diagrammatic form in Figures 4.1a,b
and 4.2a,b for convenience. The first panel
of results in the table shows the regional in-
come, inequality, and welfare situation be-
fore the transfers take place. As discussed
earlier, before the transfers take place, re-
gional mean incomes vary directly with re-
gional inequality. The second panel of results
presents the situation after we account for
the direct impact of the transfers. There we
see that mean incomes increase on average
by 2 percent but that this growth is distrib-
uted strongly in favor of the poorest regions.
For example, the poorest region, Southeast,
exhibits an 8.8 percent increase in mean
income. This is as expected because the
transfers are targeted at the poor and these
regions have higher poverty rates. The lack
of any direct impact in urban areas is due
to the concentration of the program exclu-
sively on the rural poor. Because the trans-
fers were concentrated in the lowest income
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28These are crude measures in that household size may vary by income level. For example, if the poor have larger
families then these numbers would be an underestimate of the percentage poverty gap.
29Obviously this tax should not be collected from those sufficiently near the poverty line that payment of the tax
would push them into poverty. Also, in practice governments have to resort to “distortionary” tax instruments
which would tend to require a higher tax rate (reflecting the substitution of households away from taxed activities).
These, and other such issues, are addressed by our analysis that follows.
Table 4.2 Poverty profile using household survey data (ENIGH96)
Poverty indices Regional distribution of poor
Region Headcount Gap Severity Headcount Severity
North 0.332 0.091 0.036 0.060 0.040
Central 0.529 0.199 0.098 0.240 0.272
Southwest 0.451 0.164 0.080 0.117 0.128
Southeast 0.589 0.239 0.122 0.293 0.373
Urban 0.18 0.049 0.019 0.29 0.186
All regions 0.333 0.116 0.054 1 1













































Table 4.3 Distribution of welfare after rural program impact
Initial Direct effect Total effect from subsidy Total effect from SVAT
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Mean income Inequality Welfare income Inequality Welfare income Inequality Welfare income Inequality Welfare
North 1,349 0.437 759 1,396 0.373 875 1,317 0.360 843 1,323 0.362 844
(0.035) –(0.172) (0.152) –(0.024) –(0.176) (0.11) –(0.019) –(0.172) (0.111)
Central 1,878 0.411 517 943 0.332 630 904 0,316 618 909 0.328 611
(0.074) –(0.238) (0.218) (0.03) –(0.231) (0.196) (0.035) –(0.202) (0.181)
Southwest 975 0.417 568 1032 0.339 682 1,001 0.337 664 990 0.336 657
(0.058) –(0.23) (0.2) (0.027) –(0.192) (0.168) (0.015) –(0.194) (0.156)
Southeast 782 0.411 461 851 0.332 568 843 0.331 564 828 0.334 551
(0.088) –(0.238) (0.234) (0.078) –(0.195) (0.224) (0.059) –(0.187) (0.197)
Urban 1,868 0.462 1,005 1,868 0.462 1,005 1,861 0.469 988 1,847 0.464 990
(0.) (0.) (0.) –(0.004) (0.015) –(0.017) –(0.011) (0.004) –(0.015)
All 1,429 0.506 706 1,458 0.456 793 1,440 0.459 779 1,430 0.459 774
(0.02) –(0.11) (0.124) (0,008) –(0.093) (0.104) (0.001) –(0.093) (0.096)
Total effect from BVAT Total effect from PVAT Total effect from TVAT Total effect from HVAT
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Mean income Inequality Welfare income Inequality Welfare income Inequality Welfare income Inequality Welfare
North 1,315 0.356 847 1,390 0.386 853 1,386 0.384 854 1,391 0.387 853
–(0.025) –(0.185) (0.115) (0.03) –(0.117) (0.124) (0.027) –(0.121) (0.124) (0.031) (0.114) (0.123)
Central 905 0.326 610 929 0.340 613 937 0.346 613 937 0.346 613
(0.031) –(0.207) (0.18) (0.058) –(0.173) (0.186) (0.067) –(0.158) (0.185) (0.067) –(0.158) (0.185)
Southwest 986 0.336 655 1,006 0.339 665 1,005 0.34 663 1,005 0.339 664
(0.011) –(0.194) (0.152) (0.032) (0.187) (0.17) (0.031) –(0.185) (0.167) (0.031) –(0.187) (0.169)
Southeast 828 0.334 551 831 0.334 553 830 0.335 552 830 0.334 553
(0.059) –(0.187) (0.197) (0.063) (0.187) (0.202) (0.061) –(0.185) (0.198) (0.061) –(0.187) (0.2)
Urban 1,850 0.464 992 1,825 0.466 975 1,824 0.465 976 1,823 0.467 972
–(0.01) (0.004) –(0.013) –(0.023) (0.009) –(0.03) –(0.024) (0.006) –(0.029) –(0.024) (0.011) –(0.033)
All 1,431 0.459 774 1,428 0.460 771 1,428 0.46 771 1,427 0.461 769
(0.001) –(0.093) (0.097) –(0.001) –(0.091) (0.092) –(0.001) –(0.091) (0.092) –(0.001) –(0.089) (0.09)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent change from the initial situation.tercile, inequality also falls substantially, on
average by 11 percent of the previous level.
But this fall varies inversely with mean in-
come, being strongest in the three poorest
regions (at around 23 percent). Both of these
combine to produce an average increase in
welfare of 12.4 percent, which is similarly
biased toward the poorest regions.
Focusing on the direct effect ignores the
fact that the program has to be financed, in
this case domestically. Earlier we showed
that the indirect welfare effects associated
with domestic financing arise from three
sources: (1) a redistribution effect reflecting
the fact that someone has to pay for the
transfers through taxation; (2) a realloca-
tion effect reflecting the fact that those on
whom the tax burden falls may have differ-
ent propensities for spending income on
taxed commodities than do those who re-
ceive transfers; and (3) a distortionary effect
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Figure 4.1b Regional distribution of inequality impact














Percentage change in income
Figure 4.1a Regional distribution of income effectwhen distortionary (as opposed to lump-
sum) taxation is used to finance the pro-
gram. The first effect captures the implica-
tion of the program for equity, whereas the
latter two capture the implications for effi-
ciency. The remaining panels incorporate
these indirect general equilibrium effects for
alternative financing packages. The third
panel simulates the situation when the pro-
gram is financed by the elimination of agri-
culture subsidies and represents the actual
situation. The remaining panels simulate
hypothetical financing alternatives involving
different reforms of the structure of value-
added taxes (VATs).
As indicated in Table 3.3 in the previous
chapter, the existing VAT structure involves
a “low” zero VAT on agriculture and pro-
cessed foods, a “middle” 5 percent rate on
light and intermediate manufacturing, and a
“high” 10 percent rate on consumer dur-
ables and capital goods. The famous Ramsey
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Figure 4.2a Regional distribution of income effecttax rule provides the following rule of
thumb for characterizing efficient tax sys-
tems: commodity taxes should be inversely
related to own-price elasticities.30Typically,
necessities such as food have low price
elasticities and luxuries such as consumer
durables have high elasticities, suggesting
that an efficient VATsystem would have high
taxes for food and low taxes for consumer
durables. This, of course, is undesirable from
an equity perspective because necessities are
more important in the budgets of the poor,
thus introducing an inevitable trade-off be-
tween equity and efficiency. Therefore, in
practice one often observes low taxes (or
even subsidies) on food and high taxes on
consumer durables. However, in subsistence
economies with substantial consumption
from home production (as opposed to from
purchases through the market) the relevant
net market trade elasticities can be quite
high so that taxes (or subsidies) on such
trade can be highly distortionary.
From the preceding one can character-
ize the removal of agricultural subsidies as
the removal of highly distortionary price
wedges. Likewise, the increase in VAT rates
on food (BVAT and SVAT) results in a more
efficient tax system. Aproportional increase
in VAT rates (PVAT) just exacerbates the
inefficiency inherent in the existing VAT
structure, while this is further exacerbated
by having either a higher uniform top rate
(TVAT) or by increasing the high rate
(HVAT).
The third panel looks at the total effect
on real incomes when the transfers are fi-
nanced by the elimination of agricultural
subsidies. Here, average mean incomes in-
crease by 0.8 percent compared to the pre-
transfer situation, capturing the efficiency
gains from eliminating distortionary agri-
cultural subsidies. However, one observes
very different effects across regions. The
mean incomes of the three poorest regions
increase, while the mean incomes for the
two richest regions decrease. In aggregate,
then, the three poorest regions receive pos-
itive net transfers while the two richest
experience negative net transfers. The latter
is particularly pronounced in North where,
although the direct transfers increase mean
incomes by 3.5 percent, when the incidence
of taxation is accounted for it leads to a 2.4
percent fall in mean income. Thus the tax
incidence inherent in the elimination of
food subsidies falls disproportionately on
this region. It is also the case that allowing
for program financing leads to a relatively
greater decrease in the mean incomes in the
richer regions relative to the situation with-
out financing and thus contributes to a re-
duction in inter-regional inequalities in rural
areas. For example, the effect of program
financing is to reduce the effect of the
transfers on mean incomes by 5.9 percent
points in North but by only 1 percent point
in Southeast.
Inequality also falls within the poorest
regions (i.e., Southeast, Central, and South-
west) so that one observes a substantial
increase in welfare in these regions of be-
tween 16.8 percent and 22.4 percent. The
fact that the fall in inequality within these
regions is lower than that observed for the
direct effect in isolation indicates that the
overall incidence of taxation is regressive
in spite of the decrease in inter-regional
inequality. Although mean income falls by
2.4 percent in North, inequality also de-
creases by 17.6 percent, resulting in an over-
all increase in welfare of 11 percent. The
fact that inequality increases within Urban
also implies that the incidence of taxation
here is also regressive and, when combined
with a fall in mean income, this leads to a
1.7 percent fall in welfare. The smaller de-
creases in inequality (relative to the situa-
tion ignoring taxation) in the remaining rural
regions indicates that the incidence of taxa-
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30See Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Newbery and Stern (1987), Coady (1997), and Coady and
Drèze (2002) for more detailed discussion.tion is regressive and, because all these
regions also experience increases in mean
incomes, welfare also increases from be-
tween 16.8 percent and 22.4 percent com-
pared to the pre-program situation. In
aggregate, we observe a smaller decrease
in inequality of 9.3 percent (compared to
11 percent before taxation), indicating that
nationally the incidence of taxation is re-
gressive. When combined with the 0.8 per-
cent increase in mean income, this results in
a 10.4 percent increase in welfare.
The fourth and fifth panels present, re-
spectively, the results when the program is
financed by (1) a movement to a single uni-
form rate (SVAT) and (2) a uniform rate in
place of the low and middle rates (BVAT).
Both these now involve a higher tax on
processed foods and light and intermediate
manufactures, sectors located in urban
areas. But the uniform single rate also in-
volves a lower rate for consumer durables
and capital goods and these sectors are also
located in urban areas. The impacts on re-
gional mean incomes are presented in Fig-
ure 4.1a, comparing these to the results that
ignore program financing and to financing
through eliminating agricultural subsidies.
The overall increase in mean income, al-
though positive because of the move to a
more efficient tax system, is much smaller
than under the elimination of agricultural
subsidies (i.e., 0.1 percent compared to 0.8
percent). The effect on overall inequality re-
mains the same so that tax incidence is still
regressive, but welfare still increases by 9.6
percent and 9.7 percent under both programs,
respectively.
Although mean income in Urban expe-
riences a larger fall, this is more than offset
by a much less regressive tax incidence
(i.e., a lower increase in inequality in Fig-
ure 4.1b), leading to a somewhat smaller
decrease in welfare than under subsidy re-
moval. We also observe smaller increases in
mean incomes in Southwest and Southeast,
consistent with these regions being more
reliant on transfers from urban areas. When
combined with little differences in inequal-
ity reductions, this leads to a smaller in-
crease in welfare than under subsidy financ-
ing. The decrease in mean income in North
is substantially smaller than that under sub-
sidy reduction, but North still experiences
negative net transfers. With North experi-
encing a slight decrease in the regressivity
of the tax system, which is now neutral
relative to the without-taxation scenario,
welfare increases only by slightly more than
it did under subsidy reduction (11.1 percent
compared to 11 percent). Although Central
experiences a slightly higher increase in
mean income this is offset by a substantially
smaller decrease in inequality capturing a
more regressive tax incidence so that the
welfare increase is smaller than that under
subsidy reductions.
The final three panels of Table 4.3 pre-
sent the impacts when the program is in-
stead financed by VAT reforms that involve
increases in the middle and high rates: (1) a
proportional increase where food retains a
zero rate (PVAT), (2) a uniform top rate that
involves an increase in the middle rate but a
fall in the high rate (TVAT), and (3) an in-
crease in the top rate only (HVAT). In all
cases, the overall impact on mean income is
negative, capturing the greater inefficiency
in the tax structure. This is exacerbated by a
slightly smaller decrease in inequality (i.e.,
the incidence of these tax changes is more
regressive than those discussed earlier), thus
leading to a lower increase in welfare. The
regional impacts are described in Figures
4.2a,b and are compared to the impact ignor-
ing taxation and under subsidy reduction.
The first thing to notice is that mean in-
come in Urban exhibits a larger decrease at
2.4 percent compared to 0.1 percent for the
other (more efficient) VAT reforms. This
is exacerbated by a relatively large increase
in inequality (i.e., 0.6 percent to 1.1 percent
compared to 0.4 percent) so that welfare
falls by about 3 percent (compared to
around 1.4 percent). In spite of this, we
observe higher increases in mean income
in Southwest and Southeast due to the shift
away from the VAT on food that had adverse
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Whereas the new tax regimes are equally
regressive in Southeast, they are slightly
more regressive in Southwest. But their
resulting increase in welfare is still higher
than that under the VAT alternatives consid-
ered earlier. There is a substantially higher
increase in mean income in North, which
now shifts from being a net contributor to
the program to being a net beneficiary, re-
verting from around a 2 percent drop in
mean income to around a 3 percent gain.
Not only does North now benefit from the
shift away from food taxes (or the removal
of agricultural subsidies), but it is less af-
fected by the negative effects on the urban
nonfood sectors. But inequality now falls
by only around 12 percent as against around
17 percent under the alternative VAT struc-
tures, so that it exhibits only a slightly
higher increase in welfare (i.e., 12 percent
as against 11 percent). For similar reasons,
Central also experiences a substantially
higher increase in mean income. But this
again is offset by a smaller decrease in in-
equality reflecting a more regressive tax
incidence, so that the increase in welfare
is similar to those observed under the other
financing regimes. So the overall bias in
favor of rural mean incomes is offset by a
more regressive tax system, thus leading to
a relatively small difference in relative wel-
fare impacts.
We conclude by describing the distribu-
tion of poverty after the program under the
subsidy removal. In Table 4.4, we present
the impact on regional changes in poverty
rates and the distribution of poverty across
regions. Focusing on the direct impact and
the headcount index, we see that the per-
centage of people who are poor decreased
by 19 percent. This decrease is biased to-
ward the better-off rural regions, reflecting
the fact that although poverty (by all mea-
sures) is lowest in these regions, the higher
incomes mean that most of the poor are con-
centrated just below the poverty line. Thus,
the transfers are able to bring a greater pro-
portion of the poor in these regions above
this line.
Our other measures of poverty—the
poverty gap and the severity index—show
a similar result but less pronounced (Fig-
ures 4.3 and 4.4). The fact that the decrease
is less biased toward the richer rural regions
reflects the smaller degree of inefficiency in
the transfers in poorer regions. In the richer
regions a lot of income is wasted (from the
perspective of poverty alleviation) in that
it is more than sufficient to raise people out
of poverty and we are now also attaching
a value to pushing the poor “nearer” the
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Table 4.4 Impact of rural transfers on regional poverty
Headcount Gap Severity
Location Before Direct Subsidy Before Direct Subsidy Before Direct Subsidy
North 0.332 0.184 0.231 0.091 0.043 0.048 0.036 0.015 0.017
–(0.446) –(0.304) –(0.527) –(0.473) –(0.583) –(0.528)
Central 0.529 0.385 0.407 0.199 0.121 0.124 0.098 0.053 0.057
–(0.272) –(0.231) –(0.392) –(0.377) –(0.459) –(0.439)
Southwest 0.451 0.311 0.343 0.154 0.099 0.105 0.080 0.044 0.047
–(0.31) –(0.239) –(0.395) –(0.360) –(0.450) –(0.413)
Southeast 0.589 0.460 0.472 0.239 0.152 0.155 0.122 0.069 0.070
–(0.219) –(0.199) –(0.364) –(0.351) –(0.434) –(0.426)
Urban 0.180 0.180 0.188 0.049 0.049 0.052 0.019 0.019 0.021
(0.00) (0.044) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000) (0.105)
All 0.333 0.269 0.284 0.116 0.081 0.084 0.054 0.034 0.036
–(0.192) –(0.147) –(0.302) –(0.276) –(0.37) –(0.333)
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent change from initial situation.poverty line rather than to above the poverty
line, with the value increasing the greater
the initial distance from the poverty line.
However, this inefficiency is offset by the
lower initial poverty levels in richer areas
so that we still observe a bias in poverty re-
duction toward those areas in terms of per-
centage reduction. As expected, with these
poverty measures we also observe a more
substantial percentage reduction in poverty,
especially in the poorest rural regions.
As anticipated, when the fact that the
program must be financed domestically is
taken into account, the impacts on poverty
will decrease. Overall poverty decreases by
14.7 percent and 33.3 percent according to
the headcount and severity indices respec-
tively, compared to 19.2 percent and 37 per-
cent previously. But the biggest changes are
in North, which experiences a 30.4 percent
reduction in headcount poverty compared
to 44.6 percent previously. The fact that this
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Figure 4.4 Regional shares of poverty based on severity indexdifference is not as pronounced using the
severity index (52.8 percent compared to
58.3 percent previously) suggests that those
who lose from the indirect effects are con-
centrated around the poverty line. In addi-
tion, the headcount poverty increases in
Urban by 4.4 percent because these house-
holds do not receive benefits but must help
to finance the program. The increase in urban
poverty is greater using the severity index
suggesting that the poorest of the poor are
worst hit. This highlights the problems as-
sociated with geographically targeting rural
areas and raises the important issue of
horizontal equity. It is clear that any com-
prehensive poverty alleviation strategy must
incorporate urban areas.
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Summary and Conclusions
O
ver the last decade there has been a growing recognition of the important role that
social safety nets can play in any comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy. How-
ever, these are often perceived not to be very cost effective, reflecting both in-
equitable targeting to poor households and also the fact that they have often involved sub-
stantial economic inefficiency. For example, food subsidy schemes have been found to be very
poorly targeted and also financed by highly distortionary price controls. As a result, both de-
veloping country governments and the international development institutions have put a
greater emphasis on developing well-targeted direct transfer instruments. This has in turn led
to an increasing literature evaluating the welfare gains from introducing such programs. How-
ever, for the most part, this literature has focused on the transfers themselves, while ignoring
their general equilibrium welfare impacts. Even studies that address the issue of general equi-
librium impacts tend to focus more on the efficiency implications with little attempt to inte-
grate both the equity and efficiency implications. This, of course, is all the more limiting given
that improving income distribution is the central objective of these programs.
In this report we contribute to filling this research gap by focusing primarily on the indi-
rect general equilibrium impacts of the shift to better-targeted direct transfer programs. In par-
ticular, we show how the results from a computable general equilibrium model can be com-
bined with the information available in standard household surveys to provide an integrated
analysis of both the direct distributional impact of such programs and the indirect distribu-
tional and efficiency impacts arising from the alternative forms of domestic financing. Our
focus on the domestic financing aspect of these programs reflects our view that any credible
poverty alleviation strategy must have an underlying credible financing strategy, and this need
for domestic financing can have important consequences for both the level and the distribu-
tion of household incomes. For the purpose of illustration we focused on the recent introduc-
tion in Mexico of an innovative poverty alleviation transfer program called PROGRESA,
which has been used as a prototype for similar programs that have recently been implemented
in other developing countries.
In Chapter 2 we set out a very general theoretical model that identified the different
sources of the indirect welfare impacts of different financing strategies for a targeted cash-
transfer program. The analytical equations derived using the model show clearly the three
sources of welfare impacts. First, a redistribution effect arises from the fact that someone must
be taxed in order to pay for the cost of the transfer program. If high-income households bear
the brunt of this taxation, and if we attribute a social value to a more equal distribution of
income, then the resulting welfare cost will be less than the direct welfare gain from the
transfers. Second, a reallocation effect results from the fact that the pattern of demand will
change if those who finance the program have income elasticities of demand different from
37those who receive the transfers. The result-
ing demand changes can have important
consequences for government revenues
when taxes vary substantially across com-
modities. The welfare effects arise essentially
because demand shifts away from (or to-
ward) commodities for which demand was
previously too low owing to their ineffi-
ciently high tax rates. Third, a distortionary
effect arises because of the need to raise the
revenue to finance the program through
manipulating distortionary commodity taxes
and subsidies. For example, if the program
is financed by reducing distortionary sub-
sidies, then this effect is positive, but if fi-
nanced by increasing distortionary taxes then
it may be negative.
Knowledge of the above dimensions of
the welfare impact of the program also helps
us to interpret the results from our empirical
analysis in the subsequent chapters. With
this in mind, we therefore also show how
the above model can be adapted to provide
a useful framework for integrating the sim-
ulation results from a computable general
equilibrium model with the more disaggre-
gated information available in a household
data set. We further show how the three com-
ponents can be usefully subsumed within
one parameter, namely, the cost of public
funds. Because concerns for equity are the
major motivating factor for such programs,
we make explicit how these concerns are
captured by this parameter.
In Chapter 3 we described how we have
applied the theoretical framework developed
in the previous chapter to data for Mexico
to evaluate the welfare impact of introduc-
ing a targeted direct cash-transfer program
in rural areas of the country. We started by
describing the construction and structure of
the computable general equilibrium model
used to simulate the indirect welfare im-
pacts of alternative financing strategies. Our
results help to bring out clearly that the
actual program, which finances the direct
transfers by eliminating existing food sub-
sidies, has two sources of benefit: (1) the in-
troduction of a more distributionally power-
ful transfer policy instrument, and (2) the
fact that this reduces the need to trade off
equity objectives against efficiency objec-
tives when designing the tax system. Both
these factors combined result in a very large
welfare increase from such a policy reform;
for moderate concerns for income inequal-
ity, the benefit–cost ratio for the program
was around 4, which is a very high social
return by any standards.
To broaden the relevance of the analysis
to a wider set of countries with differing
possibilities for financing such transfer
programs, we also considered alternative fi-
nancing strategies. These involved different
manipulations of the existing value-added
tax system. Although the welfare gains from
these alternative financing regimes were
not as high, they were still substantial. They
were also higher when the reforms involved
changes in the tax system that made it more
efficient (e.g., redirecting tax rates toward
commodities with relatively low price elas-
ticities away from those with relatively low
elasticities). More generally, then, the indi-
rect welfare cost of funding such programs
can be substantially lowered when they are
accompanied by efficient reforms of the tax
system.
Finally, because the construction of our
computable general equilibrium model re-
quires using behavioral parameters for which
there is scant empirical evidence we thought
it important to evaluate the robustness of
our conclusions to alternative assumptions.
We therefore undertook sensitivity analysis
using a range of consumption, production,
and international trade behavioral responses.
In all cases we found that our results were
extremely robust to alternative values for
the more important parameter values.
One of the attractive features of the
computable general equilibrium model used
for our analysis is the degree of spatial dis-
aggregation it contains with separate sub-
models for four rural regions and an urban
region. Information on the differential re-
gional welfare impacts is important for a
number of reasons. For example, the regional
38 CHAPTER 5distribution of welfare impacts can be im-
portant from a political economy perspective
concerned with generating political support
for the program. Similarly, because of dif-
ferential regional impacts, the distribution
of poverty after the program may differ from
that before the program and such informa-
tion can be extremely important for the de-
sign of other components of a poverty alle-
viation strategy. For example, the exclusion
of urban areas in the first phase of the pro-
gram will obviously affect the urban–rural
shares of poverty and the indirect effects can
either mitigate or exacerbate these outcomes.
Therefore, in Chapter 4 we analyzed the
regional pattern of welfare changes in more
detail using a related but somewhat different
methodology, which is becoming increas-
ingly popular in the literature, to evaluate
the welfare impact of the transfer program.
This approach focuses separately on the im-
pacts on both mean income and the inequal-
ity of its distribution and views total welfare
as the product of the two. We find this ap-
proach particularly useful for examining
the regional variations in the welfare impact
of the program and its application here
provides a useful example of its application
and its relationship to the approach used in
earlier chapters. In that chapter we analyze
the differential regional impacts that targeted
transfer programs can generate, and how
this spatial distribution of welfare changes
differs across alternative domestic financing
arrangements. Our analysis makes use of the
regional disaggregation of the underlying
social accounting matrix and computable
general equilibrium model. We identify four
rural regions (i.e., North, Central, South-
west, and Southeast) and one Urban re-
gion, which differ according to production
and consumption patterns as well as inter-
regional flows.
Our analysis highlights the following
features of the results. First, the direct im-
pact of the transfers (i.e., before their fi-
nancing is accounted for) differs regionally
owing to the initial distribution of poverty
varying across regions. The poorest regions
experience both the largest increases in mean
incomes and the largest decreases in in-
equality. The large decreases in inequality
reflect (by construction) the high distribu-
tional power of the targeted program. Sec-
ond, the incidence of the taxation introduced
to finance the program differs substantially
across regions and is regressive overall. The
progressive effect of program financing in
terms of decreasing inter-regional inequal-
ity is more than offset by the regressive
effect in terms of increasing intraregional
inequality. Thus, the overall effect on in-
equality is lower than that under the direct
effect alone. The high distributional power
inherent in the targeted nature of the pro-
gram means that inequality decreases in all
rural regions.
Third, the aggregate effect of taxation
is very sensitive to the program financing
strategy. The move to a more efficient tax
system (e.g., removing agriculture subsidies
or increasing VAT on necessities) both in-
creases aggregate income and is less regres-
sive than moves toward the more inefficient
alternatives (e.g., involving increasing taxes
on luxuries). Fourth, the regional effects of
taxation are also very sensitive to the pro-
gram financing strategy. The more efficient
tax systems have a clear bias in favor of
urban areas, resulting in a lower negative
impact on urban mean income and also a
less regressive tax incidence. The less effi-
cient tax systems lead to higher mean in-
comes in all rural areas, but especially in
North and Central. But the latter come at a
cost in terms of a more regressive tax inci-
dence. The relatively smaller positive effect
on mean incomes in Southeast and South-
west (compared to North and Central) under
the inefficient tax systems reflects the rel-
atively stronger negative impact of lower
mean income in urban areas. Fifth, although
the program leads to a substantial decrease in
poverty at the national level, the exclusion
of urban areas means that urban poverty in-
creases and, after the program, accounts
for a substantially higher proportion of
total national poverty (i.e., an increase from
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 3918 percent before the program to 30 percent
after the program). The increase in urban
poverty is also sensitive to the financing
strategy used, with the less (more) efficient
tax system leading to a 10 percent (5 per-
cent) increase in urban poverty. This high-
lights the shortcomings inherent in rural
targeting and raises concerns associated with
horizontal equity.
To summarize, one of the main purposes
of this report is to bring out clearly the need
to consider the general equilibrium conse-
quences of redesigning social safety nets
with the objective of making them more cost
effective. To this end we have presented a
framework that facilitates such an analysis
by showing how the results from an applied
computable general equilibrium model can
be integrated with the information available
in household surveys to provide a more
comprehensive evaluation of the welfare
implications of domestically financed tar-
geted transfer programs. In the context of a
cash-transfer program in Mexico, our results
indicate that the general equilibrium welfare
impacts associated with domestic financing
can be quite substantial. When initial re-
distribution mechanisms are inefficient, the
welfare gains from switching to a better tar-
geted direct transfer scheme are reinforced
by efficiency gains associated with the re-
moval of relatively distortionary financing
instruments. More generally, the indirect
welfare costs associated with domestic fi-
nancing can be reduced by taking the op-
portunity to reform the existing tax system
to reduce any existing trade-off that exists
between efficiency and equity objectives.
Our analysis of the spatial distribution of
these welfare impacts helps to highlight the
importance of recognizing the shortcomings
of crude geographic targeting. Not only did
the urban poor not benefit from the trans-
fer program but they were also adversely af-
fected by the general equilibrium impacts of
the program. However, we also found that
accompanying the transfer program with
efficient reforms of the tax system can not
only minimize this adverse impact but may
actually lead to the urban poor benefiting
through the general equilibrium changes in
incomes and prices.
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Description of Two-Step Procedure for
Integrating the Results of the CGE Model
with the Disaggregated Household Data
T
he social welfare function is assumed to take the typical Bergson–Samuelson form,
defined over h = 1, H households:
W(V1(q, w, m1) ,  ...,  Vh(q, w, mh) ,  ...,  VH(q, w, mH))
where Vh(q, w, mh) is the indirect utility function for household h, q is a vector of consumer
commodity prices, w is a vector of factor prices (say, the wage rate for labor), and mh is house-
hold lump-sum income (i.e., from government transfers). This is the same function as that in
the text, with commodity and factor prices separated out for convenience. For a revenue neu-
tral domestically financed transfer program, all changes in welfare come through changes in
these three vectors (i.e., changes in lump-sum incomes, consumer commodity prices, and
factor prices). Fully differentiating the social welfare function in the preceding, the welfare
effects brought about by the domestically financed transfer program are:
∂W ∂Vh ∂W ∂Vh ∂W ∂Vh
dW =Σ
h
—— —— dmh +Σ
h
—— —— dq +Σ
h
—— —— dw
∂Vh ∂mh ∂Vh ∂q ∂Vh ∂w
where the first term captures the direct welfare effect from income transfers and the final two
terms capture the indirect welfare effects coming through the resulting general equilibrium
changes in commodity and factor prices, respectively.
From Roy’s identity, the partial derivatives of the indirect utility function with respect to
consumer commodity prices (subscripted i) and factor prices (subscripted j) are:
∂Vh ∂Vh










h are the consumption of commodity i and the supply of factor j by each house-
hold, respectively. Defining βh ≡∂ W/∂mh, as before, and using substituting these into the






















Rearranging equation (10) and multiplying














Multiplying and dividing the last term in
brackets by q, and using the household
budget constraint, this can be rewritten as:
dW =Σ
h




where  φh and  γh are the proportionate
changes in household income attributable
to the direct transfers and indirect (factor)
income effects respectively, ρi is the pro-
portionate change in the price of com-
modity i, and θi
h is the share of expenditure
on commodity i in the total expenditure of
the household. The term in brackets can be
interpreted as the proportionate change in
real incomes (i.e., nominal incomes minus a
cost-of-living index). These proportionate
changes are outputs from the CGE model
and are then applied to household-level data.
42 APPENDIX AAPPENDIX B
Details of the CGE Model Structure
I
n this appendix we present a more detailed discussion than that in the text of important fea-
tures of the model structure. We discuss, in turn, the Armington treatment of imports, the
system of price equations, and the LES consumption behavior.
The Armington Function
The use of the Armington function in trade differs from the standard neoclassical trade model
in which all goods are tradable and all domestically produced goods are perfectly substitutable
with imports. The standard treatment has several drawbacks. It leads to the conclusion that the
domestic relative price of tradeables is fully determined by world prices, which is not the case
empirically. These models result in the full transmission of world price changes and in extreme
specialization in production. In the Armington framework, the economy is less responsive
to world price changes, thus dampening the move toward specialization. Also, this setup ac-
counts for two-way trade in a given sector, which occurs regularly even in very disaggregated
sectors.
De Melo and Robinson (1989) show the importance of the elasticity of substitution in their
discussion of how a term of trade deterioration affects the exchange rate. For a low elasticity,
say 0, the exchange rate must depreciate so that the country can export more to earn the for-
eign exchange needed for the nonsubstitutable import. For a higher elasticity, the economy
switches its production from the export sector into the domestic substitute for the import. To
encourage this contraction of exports, the exchange rate must appreciate.
The parameters for this CGE model are given in Appendix Table E.5. The trade parame-
ters were not available empirically, and thus may be considered “guestimates.”
Price Determination and Role of Taxes
The price equations in the model (see Appendix D) highlight the imperfect substitutability in
trade and show where the taxes fit into this model. Equations (12) and (13) describe the
import price (PMc) and export price (PEc), respectively. These prices depend on the world
price, valued in domestic currency, along with the import tariff or export tax. With the
world prices set exogenously, the country is assumed to be “small.”
PQc, the domestic composite price [equation (14)], is the average of the price of the com-
modity produced and sold domestically and the price of the imported commodity, weighted by
their respective quantities, plus the sales tax. Thus, the sales tax is imposed on both domesti-
cally produced goods as well as imports (which are already tariff-ridden). Implicit in equa-
tion (14) is the Armington assumption (described previously), as the price that the consumer
faces is not totally determined by world prices.
43Equation (15) gives the average output
price of the commodity output, PXc. It is
the weighted average of the price of domes-
tically produced goods sold domestically
and domestically produced goods that are
exported. This equation reflects the use of
the CET function described in the second
section of Chapter 3, which implies that the
world price is not completely transmitted
to the output price that domestic producers
receive.
In equation (18), the value-added price,
PVAa, is described as the activity price
minus any tax on (or subsidy to) producers,
as well as the cost of intermediate goods.
Equations (19) and (20) give the definitions
of the consumer price index and the pro-
ducer price index, respectively. As is stan-
dard in CGE models, this model solves for
relative prices. Thus one price, in this case,
the consumer price index, is chosen as the
numeraire, around which the other prices,
including the exchange rate, are based.
Equation (22) describes factor demands
that are derived from the first-order condi-
tions of the CES function for the primary
factors. In the model it is assumed that the
primary factors are paid the same economy-
wide rental or wage rate (WF f), regardless of
sector. To adjust for distortions in factor mar-
kets, a sector specific variable (WFDIST f,a)
is included. If there are no distortions in a
particular factor market, this variable is equal
to 1 for all sectors. This equation shows that
marginal cost must equal marginal revenue;
because  PVA is multiplied by the value-
added tax, tvaa, it can be seen that an in-
crease in the value-added tax lowers the
marginal revenue product and, ceteris
paribus, lowers factor demand.
The income tax, TTINS, appears in the
equations for institutional behavior in Ap-
pendix D [equations (37)–(39)]. It is imposed
as a lump-sum tax (i.e., it does not affect the
agent’s decisions with respect to earning in-
come) on households and the enterprise. For
both types of institutions, the income tax af-
fects the amount of inter-institutional trans-
fers, as taxes must be netted out of income
before any transfers can be made. Similarly,
savings is based on net income. Households
do not pay income tax on home consumption.
Consumption Behavior
Consumption is determined by LES demand
functions, with separate equations written
for marketed consumption and home con-
sumption.31 The LES equation comes from





where the subscript i refers to commodities,
C is total household consumption, γ is sub-
sistence consumption, and φ is the marginal
propensity to consume each commodity. The
resulting demand functions, in equations 40
and 41 of Appendix D show that the amount
of expenditure on a good will consist of the
subsistence expenditure plus the marginal
budget share of the “supernumerary income”
—that is, the income that is left over after
accounting for the subsistence expenditures
of all other goods. The parameters for the
system were not available for Mexico; in-
stead, they come from the adaptation of
parameters used in a study of Zimbabwe
(Bautista et al. 1999). These parameters are
presented in Appendix Table E.6.
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31Note that the use of two interdependent functions is necessitated by the differentiation between activities
(whose purchase by households designates home consumption) and commodities (whose purchase by households
signifies marketed consumption).APPENDIX C
CGE Model Sets, Variables, and Parameters



















a shift parameter for CES activity production function
αac
a shift parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function
αq
c shift parameter for Armington function
αt
c shift parameter for CET function
βh
a,h LES marginal budget shares for home consumed goods (activities)
βm
c,h LES marginal budget shares for marketed goods (commodities)
cwtsc consumer price index weights
δa
f,a share parameter for CES activity production function
δac
a,c share parameter for domestic commodity aggregation function
δq
c share parameter for Armington function
δt
c share parameter for CET function
dwtsc domestic sales price weights
γh
a,h LES subsistence minima for home consumed goods (activities)
γ m
c,h LES subsistence minima for marketed goods (commodities)
45icac,a intermediate input c per unit of activity a
insuba input subsidy for activity a
mpsins marginal propensity to save for domestic institution
p01ins 0–1 parameter (1 for institution with variable income tax rate, 0 for others)
p04a 0–1 parameter (1 for activity with variable VAT rate, 0 for others)
qbardstc inventory investment by sector of origin
qbargc exogenous (unscaled) government demand
qbarinvc exogenous (unscaled) investment demand
ρac
c domestic commodity aggregation function exponent
ρq
c Armington function exponent
ρa
a CES activity production function exponent
ρt
c CET function exponent
shifid,f share of domestic institution id in income of factor f
shiiid,idp share of domestic institution id in post-tax post-savings income of institution idp
supernumh LES supernumerary income
taa producer tax rate
tece export tax rate
tff tax per physical unit of factor f
θa,c yield of commodity c per unit of activity a
tinsins direct tax rate on institution ins
tmc tariff rates on imports of c
tqc sales tax
tri,aac transfers from institution or factor ACC to institution i
tvaa value-added tax for activity a
Variables
CPI consumer price index (PQ-based)
DPI index for domestic-sales producer prices (PDS-based)
DTAXADJ direct tax scaling factor
DTINS change in domestic institution tax share




GADJ government demand scaling factor
GSAV government savings
IADJ investment scaling factor (for fixed capital formation)
INVEST total investment value
PAa output price of activity a
PDDc demand price for commodity c produced and sold domestically
PDSc supply price for commodity c produced and sold domestically
PEc price of exports
PMc price of imports
PQc price of composite good c
PVAa value added price
PWEce world price of exports
PWMcm world price of imports
PXc average output price
46 APPENDIX CPXACa,c price of commodity c from activity a
QAa domestic activity output
QDc domestic sales
QEcm exports
QF f,a demand for factor f from activity a
QFSf factor supply
QGc government consumption
QHc,h household consumption demand
QINTc intermediate demand for c
QINV c fixed investment demand
QMcm imports
QQc composite goods supply
QXc commodity output
QXACa,c ouput of commodity c from activity a
SADJ savings adjustment variable for domestic institutions
SAVINGS total savings value
TRIIi,ip transfers to domestic institution i from domestic institution ip
TTINSins total direct tax on institution ins
TVAADJ change in activity’s VAT share
WALRAS savings-investment imbalance (should be zero)
WF f average factor price (rent)
WFDISTf,a factor market distortion variable
YDid expendable income
YF f factor income
YG government income
YHAh own household consumption/income
YHMh marketed income
YIins income of (domestic nongovernmental) institution i
YIF ins,f income of institution i from factor f
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Model Equations
Price Block
PMcm = PWMcm⋅(1 + tmcm)⋅EXR (12)
PEcd = PWEce⋅(1 – tece)⋅EXR (13)
PQc⋅(1 – tqc)⋅QQc = PDDc⋅QDc + PMcm⋅QMcm (14)
PXc⋅QXc = PDSc⋅QDc + PEce⋅QEce (15)

















































































QXcne = QDcne (28)















QQcnm = QDcnm (31)









YF f =ΣWF f ⋅WFDISTf,a⋅QF f,a (33)
YIF id,f = shifid,f ⋅(YF f – tr row,f ⋅EXR)






+ trid,gov + trid,row⋅EXR (35)
TTINSidp = (DTAXADJ⋅tinsidp
– DTINS⋅p01idp) (36)
TRIIid,en = shiiid,en⋅(1 – SADJ⋅mpsen)
⋅(1 – TTINSen)⋅YIen (37)
TRIIid,h = shiiid,h⋅((1 – SADJ⋅mpsh)
⋅(1 – TTINSh)⋅YHMh + YHAh) (38)





















































QGc = GADJ⋅qbargc (46)
GSAV = YG – EG (47)








⋅(1 – TTINSen)⋅YIen +Σ
h
sadj⋅mpsh
⋅(1 – TTINSh)⋅YHMh + YHAh) 
+ GSAV + FSAV⋅EXR (50)
MODEL EQUATIONS 49System Constraint Block
QQc = QINTc +Σ
h
QHc,h + QGc















SAVINGS = INVEST + WALRAS (54)
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Supplementary Tables
Table E.1 Rural regions
Regions States
North Baja California Norte, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon
Central Durango, Zacatecas, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosi, Guanajuato, Queretaro, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala,
Puebla, Tamaulipas
Southwest Nayarit, Jalisco, Colima, Michoacan, Estado de Mexico, Distrito Federal, Guerrero, Morelos
Southeast Veracruz, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Yucatan, Quintana Roo
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4. Other grains (sorghum, barley)
5. Fruits and vegetables
6. Other crops (tobacco, hemp, cotton, cocoa, sugar, coffee, soy, safflower, sesame, and others)
7. Livestock/forestry/fisheries (bovines, goats, sheep, bees, poultry and others, forestry and fisheries)
8. Dairy




13. Other processed foods (coffee manufacturing, processed meats, oils and fats, feeds, alcohol, beverages,
and others)
14. Light manufacturing (lumber, wood, paper, print, and cigar manufacturing, soft fiber textiles, hard fiber
textiles, other textiles, leather, apparel)
15. Intermediates (chemicals, synthetics, rubber, glass, cement, fertilizers, other chemicals, oil refining, oil
and gasoline, petrochemicals, coal, iron, nonferrous metal, sand/gravel, minerals)
16. Consumer items (pharmaceuticals, soaps, plastic, metal furnishings, household appliances, electronic
equipment, automobiles and parts)
17. Capital goods (metal products, metal manufacturing, nonelectronic machines, electronic machines, other
electric goods, transportation materials, mineral manufacturing, iron manufacturing, nonferrous metal
manufacturing, others)
18. Professional services (professional services, education, medical, finance/real estate, public administration
and defense, electricity, gas and water)
19. Other services (other services, restaurants)
20. Construction
21. Commerce, trade, and transportation
a Note that there are four activities for each of the agricultural crop sectors (sectors 1–6): one for each region.
Otherwise, the activities are the same as these sectors. The commodities are the same as these sectors.
Table E.3 Disaggregation across income groups and regions
(distribution of households across national income deciles by region)
Regions
Decile group North Central Southwest Southeast Urban
First decile (bottom) 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.03
Second decile 0.09 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.05
Third decile 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.07
Fourth decile 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09
Fifth decile 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.10
Sixth decile 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.11
Seventh decile 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.13
Eighth decile 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.13
Ninth decile 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.14
Tenth decile (top) 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.15
Share of bottom decile in bottom three deciles 0.23 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.20
Note: Numbers are the proportion of households in the region falling into each decile.






















Table E.4 Summary statistics
Sectoral composition (percentage)
Imports/
Producer Sales Export Domestic Exports/ domestic
tax VAT tax Tariff tax Output supply Imports Exports output supply
Maize 0 — 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.62 0.83 1.17 0.03 0.85 24.19
Wheat –0.571 — 0.000 0.007 0.032 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 1.44 0.07
Beans –0.003 — 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.17 29.03 24.37
Other grain –0.449 — 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.15
Fruits and vegetables –0.001 — 0.006 0.000 0.018 0.75 0.64 0.32 0.95 23.43 8.55
Other crops –0.002 — 0.007 0.016 0.006 0.84 0.77 1.55 1.89 41.72 34.75
Livestock 0.001 — 0.008 0.014 0.033 2.20 2.21 0.39 0.42 3.53 3.00
Dairy –0.308 — 0.008 0.005 0.007 1.81 1.89 0.56 0.12 1.18 5.04
Maize manufacturing –0.308 — 0.008 0.018 0.007 1.47 1.47 0.02 0.10 1.28 0.28
Wheat manufacturing –0.308 — 0.008 0.030 0.006 1.13 1.03 0.17 0.70 11.54 2.75
Fruit and vegetable preparation 0.002 — 0.006 0.017 0.009 0.30 0.20 0.18 0.69 43.62 15.60
Sugar 0.002 — 0.005 0.034 0.023 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.30 14.09 14.94
Other foods 0.002 — 0.008 0.016 0.007 4.29 4.46 3.38 2.50 10.81 13.01
Light manufacturing 0.002 0.05 0.007 0.027 0.009 5.50 5.73 11.78 10.27 34.71 35.29
Intermediates 0.002 0.05 0.006 0.016 0.019 5.43 5.57 12.50 11.44 39.14 38.54
Capital goods 0.002 0.10 0.007 0.021 0.012 7.36 9.89 46.26 30.68 77.52 80.23
Consumer items 0.002 0.10 0.007 0.023 0.006 11.96 8.41 21.24 39.74 61.78 43.33
Construction 0.003 0.10 0.006 — — 5.24 5.28 — — — —
Professional services 0.007 0.05 0.008 — — 19.96 20.15 — — — —
Other services 0.004 — 0.009 — — 11.15 11.27 — — — —
Commerce 0.003 0.1 0.009 — — 19.22 19.43 — — — —
Note: A negative entry for the producer tax represents a producer subsidy.
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Table E.5 Production elasticities
Elasticity of substitution Armington CET
for production function elasticities elasticities
Maize 0.6 4 4
Wheat 0.6 4 4
Beans 0.6 4 4
Other grains 0.6 4 4
Fruits and vegetables 0.5 2 4
Other crops 0.5 4 4
Livestock 0.6 3 0.5
Dairy 1.5 3 3
Fruit and vegetable preparation 1.5 3 3
Wheat manufacturing 1.5 3 3
Maize manufacturing 1.5 3 3
Sugar 1.5 3 3
Other foods 1.5 3 3
Light manufacturing 2.0 0.2 2
Intermediate 0.6 0.2 2
Capital goods 0.6 0.2 2
Consumer goods 1.5 0.2 2
Construction 0.8 2 2
Professional services 0.8 2 2
Other services 2.0 2 2






















Table E.6a Marginal budget shares for home-consumed goods
Sectors\households RP–N RP–C RP–SW RP–SE RM–N RM–C RM–SW RM–SE RR–N RR–C RR–SW RR–SE
Maize 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003
Wheat 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Beans 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other grains 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fruits and vegetables 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
Other crops 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: The column labels refer to the following sets of household and regions.
Households: RP (Rural Poor), RM (Rural Medium), UP (Urban Poor), UM (Urban Medium), UR (Urban Rich)
Regions: N (North), C (Central), SW (Southwest), SE (Southeast)
Table E.6b Marginal budget shares for marketed goods
Sectors\households RP–N RP–C RP–SW RP–SE RM–N RM–C RM–SW RM–SE RR–N RR–C RR–SW RR–SE
Maize 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.003 0 0.013 0.005 0
Wheat 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0 0.000 0
Beans 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.001
Other grains 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.011 0
Fruits and vegetables 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.015 0.010
Other crops 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0 0.001 0.000
Livestock 0.017 0.018 0.031 0.042 0.010 0.011 0.021 0.023 0.015 0.003 0.012 0.012
Dairy 0.066 0.057 0.066 0.050 0.045 0.035 0.052 0.041 0.023 0.010 0.065 0.028
Fruit and vegetable preparation 0.014 0.010 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.003 0 0.007 0.004
Wheat manufacturing 0.018 0.027 0.025 0.027 0.013 0.019 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.007 0.021 0.016
Maize manufacturing 0.037 0.034 0.035 0.038 0.030 0.026 0.043 0.030 0.079 0.013 0.062 0.023
Sugar 0.018 0.024 0.019 0.040 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.001 0.004 0.013 0.005
Other foods 0.079 0.061 0.058 0.062 0.079 0.056 0.067 0.059 0.056 0.043 0.067 0.050
Light manufacturing 0.049 0.041 0.034 0.032 0.049 0.051 0.047 0.038 0.051 0.048 0.063 0.045
Intermediate 0.014 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.012 0.012 0.009
Capital goods 0.110 0.071 0.068 0.063 0.103 0.081 0.080 0.067 0.105 0.094 0.095 0.078
Consumer goods 0.082 0.053 0.050 0.049 0.110 0.076 0.068 0.077 0.083 0.228 0.080 0.057
Professional services 0.083 0.077 0.081 0.072 0.082 0.076 0.071 0.068 0.043 0.156 0.086 0.053
Other services 0.134 0.136 0.101 0.087 0.138 0.167 0.134 0.153 0.135 0.107 0.127 0.185












Table E.6c Own price elasticity of home-consumed goods
Sectors/households RP–N RP–C RP–SW RP–SE RM–N RM–C RM–SW RM–SE RR–N RR–C RR–SW RR–SE
Maize –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 0 –0.6 –0.6 –0.6
Wheat –0.2 0 0 –0.2 –0.2 0 0 0 –0.6 0 0 0
Beans –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.1 –0.6 0 –0.6 –0.6
Other grains –0.2 –0.2 0 –0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 –0.6 0
Fruits and vegetables –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.3 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.6 0 0 –0.6
Other crops –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.4 –0.6 0 –0.6 –0.6
Table E.6d Own price elasticity of demand for market-consumed goods
Sectors\households RP–N RP–C RP–SW RP–SE RM–N RM–C RM–SW RM–SE RR–N RR–C RR–SW RR–SE HHUP HHUM HHUR
Maize –0.10 –0.11 –0.11 –0.11 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –– –0.61 –0.60 –– –0.10 –0.10 –0.60
Wheat –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.60 –– –0.60 –– –0.20 –0.20 –0.60
Beans –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.10 –0.60 –0.60 –0.60 –0.60 –0.10 –0.10 –0.60
Other grains –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –0.20 –– –– –0.60 –– –0.20 –0.20 –0.60
Fruits and vegetables –0.31 –0.31 –0.31 –0.30 –0.40 –0.41 –0.41 –0.40 –0.60 –0.60 –0.61 –0.60 –0.31 –0.40 –0.60
Other crops –0.40 –0.40 –0.40 –0.40 –0.40 –0.40 –0.40 –0.40 –0.60 –– –0.60 –0.60 –0.30 –0.30 –0.90
Livestock –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.70 –0.70 –0.70 –0.70 –0.90 –0.80 –0.70
Dairy –0.91 –0.91 –0.91 –0.91 –0.81 –0.81 –0.81 –0.81 –0.71 –0.70 –0.72 –0.71 –0.91 –0.81 –0.71
Fruit and vegetable  –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.80 –– –0.80 –0.80 –0.90 –0.90 –0.80
preparation
Wheat manufacturing –0.71 –0.71 –0.71 –0.71 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.71 –0.80 –0.80
Maize manufacturing –0.61 –0.61 –0.61 –0.62 –0.71 –0.71 –0.71 –0.71 –0.82 –0.80 –0.81 –0.80 –0.61 –0.70 –0.80
Sugar –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.90 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.80 –0.90 –0.90 –0.80
Other foods –0.45 –0.44 –0.43 –0.44 –0.54 –0.53 –0.53 –0.53 –0.62 –0.62 –0.63 –0.62 –0.43 –0.53 –0.62
Light manufacturing –0.43 –0.42 –0.42 –0.42 –0.52 –0.53 –0.52 –0.52 –0.62 –0.62 –0.63 –0.62 –0.42 –0.52 –0.62
Intermediate –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––
Capital goods –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––
Consumer goods –0.54 –0.53 –0.52 –0.52 –0.73 –0.72 –0.72 –0.72 –0.73 –0.77 –0.72 –0.72 –0.53 –0.72 –0.73
Professional services –0.54 –0.54 –0.54 –0.54 –0.54 –0.54 –0.54 –0.53 –0.52 –0.58 –0.54 –0.53 –0.55 –0.58 –0.60
Other services –0.91 –0.91 –0.91 –0.91 –0.91 –0.92 –0.91 –0.92 –0.83 –0.82 –0.83 –0.84 –0.91 –0.91 –0.84
Commerce –0.93 –0.94 –0.94 –0.94 –0.93 –0.93 –0.93 –0.94 –0.87 –0.85 –0.85 –0.88 –0.94 –0.93 –0.85References
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